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We welcome our readers to the fall 2017 edition of the APA 
Newsletter on Teaching. We offer this month five articles 
and a list of books for possible review.
In our first paper, Professor Andy German of the Ben-Gurion 
University of the Negev reflects upon how a conception of 
philosophical history may inform the teaching of philosophy. 
He begins with a familiar challenge to philosophy professors 
by their students: When do we pass from the study of 
historical figures in philosophy to the practice of philosophy 
itself? German pursues this question throughout his paper. 
Without wishing to anticipate the conclusions that he 
reaches after his six pedagogical reflections, he notes that 
students who raise this challenge may unwittingly stand in 
the way of a positive response to it. Most of them—and 
many of the rest of us—are used to thinking of the past 
as essentially overcome and reduced to irrelevance by the 
present, much as pocket computers have made adding 
machines and telephone books obsolete. But the nature of 
philosophy itself presents an obstacle to a transition from 
its own history to the philosophical process itself by being 
both historical and ahistorical. It is rooted in a tradition, but 
it always has the ambition to overcome its own tradition and 
to return radically to the roots of things. In his thoughtful 
reflections, German shows us how such a conception of 
philosophy may be put to use in the classroom.
Our second paper, “Philosophy That Is Ancient: Teaching 
Ancient Philosophy in Context,” Nickolas Pappas of City 
College and the Graduate Center, CUNY, concerns himself 
with the question of how a teacher of ancient philosophy 
can take advantage of students’ natural curiosity about the 
daily lives of the persons we encounter in the ancient world, 
especially those in Plato’s Dialogues. A student’s innocent 
question about the account in Phaedo of Socrates’ last words, 
“We owe a cock to Asclepius”: “So they had chickens?” 
inspired Professor Pappas to do quite a bit of research on 
life in ancient Greece, and he gives us a list of what he 
considers to be the best sources of such information. He 
discusses how he puts to pedagogical use such matters as 
the games and attire of wealthy boys, as the life and social 
and psychological role of domestic slaves, and as Socrates’ 
famous comparisons between the knowledge and art of 
shoemakers or physicians and the knowledge and art of 
the just person. (What did doctors and shoemakers know, 
and what was their skill?) The understanding of such 
everyday matters by Plato’s audience would surely have 
informed their response to Socrates’ homey comparisons 
and the questions they raise. Examples of how Greek 
practices in some area conflict with our own can also be 
thought-provoking, for such oppositions suggest deeper 
differences in the emotional or intellectual orientation 
of members of the two cultures. In conclusion, Professor 
Pappas suggests three ways in which historical background 
can be brought into philosophy classrooms.
Steven M. Cahn’s brief essay, “Teaching about the Existence 
of God,” takes off from the author’s recent book, Religion 
within Reason. He claims that in introductory courses in 
philosophy where the existence of God figures as a topic, 
instructors may mislead students by assuming a set of 
untrue or highly questionable principles. These include the 
beliefs that if the existence of God is disproved, religion is 
unreasonable, that if the Abrahamic God exists, then the 
secular is the profane, that theism implies some specific 
religious commitment, and that the only correct form of 
supernaturalism involves a belief in God. He concludes, 
“A successful defense of traditional theism requires not 
only that it be more plausible than atheism or agnosticism, 
but that it be more plausible than all other supernatural 
alternatives.” 
The fourth paper, “Considering the Classroom as a Safe 
Space,” by David Sackris of Princeton University, is in 
part a response to an article in the APA Newsletter on 
Feminism and Philosophy by Lauren Freeman, which 
argues for the creation of safe spaces on campuses and in 
classrooms where women and minority students may feel 
free of Stereotype Threat and Implicit Bias. The purpose 
of such practices is to decrease attrition and encourage 
more women and minorities to pursue philosophy as a 
career. Professor Sackris approves of Professor Freeman’s 
intentions but believes that it is sufficient to those purposes 
to create safe spaces of various kinds on campus, and that 
to do so in the classroom threatens to vitiate academic 
content and standards. In his discussion, Professor Sackris 
seems to shift from safe spaces to decrease bias and 
stereotypes to safe spaces to decrease discomfort with the 
material they are being asked to master such as units on 
abortion, race, feminism, or religion. Free self-expression 
about such topics by one group might well make another 
group feel threatened in some way. Yet denying students 
such an atmosphere of conflict may deny them valuable 
academic experiences. Surely Freeman would agree with 
that. Sackris further argues that we ought to stop talk of 
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Authors should adhere to the production guidelines that are 
available from the APA. For example, in writing your paper 
to disk, please do not use your word processor’s footnote 
or endnote function; all notes must be added manually at 
the end of the paper. This rule is extremely important, for it 
makes formatting the papers for publication much easier.
All articles submitted to the newsletter are blind-reviewed 
by the members of the editorial committee:
Tziporah Kasachkoff, The Graduate Center, CUNY 
(tkasachkoff@yahoo.com), co-editor
Eugene Kelly, New York Institute of Technology 
(ekelly@nyit.edu), co-editor
Robert Talisse, Vanderbilt University (robert.
talisse@vanderbilt.edu)
Andrew Wengraf (andrew@welch-wengraf.fsnet.uk)
Contributions for all editions may be sent to:
Tziporah Kasachkoff, Philosophy Department, 
CUNY Graduate Center, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York 
NY 10016, at tkasachkoff@yahoo.com
and/or to
Eugene Kelly, Department of Social Science, New 
York Institute of Technology, Old Westbury, NY 
11568, at ekelly@nyit.edu
ARTICLES
Philosophy and Its History: Six 
Pedagogical Reflections
Andy German
BEN GURION UNIVERSITY OF THE NEGEV
What makes teaching the history of philosophy a 
philosophical, rather than merely doxographical, enterprise? 
That is the guiding question of these reflections. It arises 
from a conviction—born of experience—that part of 
teaching the history of philosophy involves exposing 
oneself to the possibility that such teaching stands in need 
of justification.
I.
Prima facie, it is unclear why the guiding question should 
even be a question. What could be more obvious than 
the fact that Western philosophy, at least, has canonical 
texts and canonical problems arising from them, and that 
primarily and for the most part, we philosophize through 
these texts, which tradition has bequeathed to us. It seems 
equally unproblematic that being a historian of philosophy 
simply means having a professional competence in that 
tradition.
“safety” or “comfort,” and instead pursue the goals of 
decreasing stereotypes and bias without injuring the 
concept of academic freedom and the intellectual conflicts 
it necessarily fosters. He offers specific suggestions as to 
how these ends can be met.
The reply to a review, “On Happiness and Goodness,” by 
Christine Vitrano of Brooklyn College, CUNY, concerns what 
she takes to be a misunderstanding by Matthew Pinalto 
in his review of a book that she published recently with 
Steven M. Cahn, Happiness and Goodness: Philosophical 
Reflections on Living Well. The crux of the misunderstanding 
concerns a hypothetical thought-question about the 
abstractly conceived “lives” of two persons. Pinalto holds 
that the authors’ claim that there is no compelling reason to 
rate one of the two lives as better than the other neglects 
recent writers on ethics who give us theoretical reasons 
for holding that one or the other life is, in fact, better. But 
Vitrano notes that her book contains an argument that 
such theories are to be rejected. Pinalto accuses Vitrano 
and Cahn of uncritically assuming that there are no moral 
or eudemonistic reasons for preferring one life to another, 
whereas in fact the book argues that there are no such 
persuasive reasons. Indeed, against Pinalto, they claim that 
no other theory than theirs could reach the conclusion that 
both lives are equally worthy.
We always encourage our readers to suggest themselves 
as reviewers of books and other material (including 
technological innovations) that they think may be 
especially good for classroom use. Though the names of 
books and other materials that we have recently received 
from publishers for possible review are listed in our Books 
Received section in each edition of the newsletter, reviewers 
are welcome to suggest material for review that they have 
used in the classroom and found useful. However, please 
remember that our publication is devoted to pedagogy and 
not to theoretical discussions of philosophical issues. This 
should be borne in mind not only when writing articles for 
our publication but also when reviewing material for our 
publication.
SUBMISSION GUIDELINES
As always, we encourage our readers to write to us about 
their experiences as teachers. We also welcome articles 
that respond, comment on, or take issue with any of the 
material that appears within our pages. 
The following guidelines for submissions should be 
followed:
All papers should be sent to the editors electronically. 
The author’s name, the title of the paper and full mailing 
address should appear on a separate page. Nothing that 
identifies the author or his or her institution should appear 
within the body or within the footnotes/endnotes of the 
paper. The title of the paper should appear on the top of 
the paper itself.
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neither is teaching them. These could just as well be 
a flight from philosophical thinking into the minutiae 
of textual exegesis.2 Of course, the primary task of the 
teacher of past philosophical texts is to make reading into 
philosophizing. The question is how one succeeds in doing 
this and here we encounter two main difficulties, both of 
them concerned with time or the relationship philosophy 
has to time. 
The first difficulty is raised by our students, whether 
explicitly or not. Most students (and not only Americans, 
as one quickly discovers by teaching in Israel) derive their 
conception of time from their experience of technological 
change. As Heidegger observed, technology has long since 
ceased to be merely another, more intricate and powerful, 
kind of tool.3 For most students, it is the great fact of their 
lives, an all-encompassing medium through which they 
relate to the world. The picture of time operative in this 
medium is of an ever-accelerating progress in which the 
present does not merely come after the past, but replaces 
it. This is so either because the present does better what 
the past aimed to do, thus obviating that past as thoroughly 
as the steam engine obviates the stagecoach, or because 
the present opens new vistas of need or desire (and the 
technical apparatus for fulfillment of these) of which 
the past lacked all conception. The future, by extension, 
promises more of the same—ever stronger, faster, better. 
Like the proverbial fish that is always the last to discover 
water, those who live in this technological medium are 
unaware that their conception of time is only one among 
others, and a questionable one at that. In teaching past 
thinkers, of course, we must impress upon students why this 
kind of temporal experience cannot apply to philosophy, 
why philosophical understanding does not progress in this 
linear fashion, and why the transition from one thinker or 
philosophical epoch to another is neither accumulation nor 
replacement simpliciter.4 In thinking about how to do this, 
we quickly run up against the second difficulty: How, and in 
what sense, does philosophy even have a history anyway? 
Our first difficulty, then, arises from the contemporary 
context in which philosophical pedagogy takes place, by 
which I mean the place from which we must begin because 
that is where our students are. The second, as we will now 
see, arises from the nature of philosophy itself. 
III.
If philosophy is an intrinsically historical, i.e., temporal, 
phenomenon it would seem that it ought to have a 
beginning in time. Our ability to identify philosophy 
depends on our ability to identify when it became 
something distinguishable from other expressions of 
man’s spiritual life. When and where was this beginning? 
The standard introductory answer is at least as old as 
Aristotle. Thales, Aristotle reports, was the founder of that 
type of philosophical thinking which sought first principles. 
For Thales, this principle was material—water.5 Customarily, 
I then tell students that while Thales may very well have 
had predecessors and while he probably drew on common 
Near Eastern cosmological motifs, he was nevertheless the 
first clearly attested thinker to abandon the mythological 
explanations of Greek and other traditions in favor of the 
use of the unaided powers of human observation and 
reasoning about those observations. And so, I conclude 
What is more, it is arguably impossible even to conceive 
how we could begin philosophizing except as part of such 
a tradition. No one, after all, springs full-grown from the 
womb declaring that “Being is said in many ways.” One 
learns to identify what philosophical questions are and 
how to approach them mostly through participating in the 
institutional life of philosophy. Contemporary academic 
philosophy is only the latest incarnation of this life, which 
has its roots in Plato’s Academy, if not earlier. As this 
institutional life changes so too do the questions and 
answers that are treated as philosophical going concerns. 
This last fact is important, though easily forgotten. In fact, 
a solid grounding in the history of philosophy may be the 
only way to prevent such forgetfulness. Take, for example, 
the “mind-body problem”—that old war-horse which, by 
now, has been ridden into the ground many times over. 
Schematically stated, the problem is as follows: Our bodies 
are entirely subordinated to unbending natural laws 
(laws formulated today in the language of mathematical 
physics). These laws describe a world in which the only 
things having verifiable existence are mass-points moving 
in, and influenced by, fields of force. In addition, there is 
a rather disparate collection of phenomena which, since 
at least Descartes, have been grouped together under the 
term “mind” or “the mental.” This collection includes all 
those events that occupy no readily identifiable position 
in space and are accompanied by a sense of interiority 
and immediacy we express with the first person singular. 
The relationship between these two realms (even the 
question of whether they are actually separate realms at 
all) has begotten whole libraries. It is a quaestio vexata 
so relentlessly familiar, so intractable, that it can seem to 
be coterminous with philosophy itself, simply part of the 
“frame of this world,” as it were. Of course, it is nothing of 
the kind.
The problem in its current form was unknown to the 
Greeks, who did not have a word exactly corresponding to 
our “mind.” This was not because they were too naïve to be 
acquainted with the various phenomena we group under 
that word; everyone is acquainted with these phenomena. 
It was rather that the Greek concept of psychē, and its 
relationship to body (sōma), was understood differently. 
Aristotle, for example, would likely have judged the early 
modern concepts “matter” and “body” infected with such 
incoherence as to be beyond all repair, and the same 
would then follow for the supposed problem of how “mind” 
relates to this body.1
The mind-body problem, then—like the problem of 
free will and determinism and some others—is neither 
necessary nor universal. It arises at a particular time, in a 
specific philosophical tradition with its specific historical 
trajectory. In order to know that this is so, one must know 
the history. A small adjustment of the Latin phrase thus 
seems to yield an unanswerable justification for the history 
of philosophy—primum legere, deinde philosophari; first 
read, then philosophize.
II.
Unfortunately, matters are not so simple. To read the texts 
of past philosophers is not necessarily to philosophize; 
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that are conditions for an organism having a functioning 
eye, and we can describe these processes. We can also give 
a chronological account of the various neural events that 
accompany seeing. None of these is a description of sight, 
however. There is neither development, maturation nor, 
really, process of any kind in the act of seeing. Whenever 
we see, sight is fully present as itself. The same is true of 
philosophical reason. If it represents a universal and always 
available human possibility, it is not a cumulative product 
of a historical process. Sensu stricto, its past is irrelevant to 
its essence. 
I am not surprised, then, when some of my brighter 
students (as well as some academic colleagues) wonder 
aloud when they can finally have done with interpreting 
past philosophers and move on to “actual philosophizing.” 
Why, in other words, not face the philosophical problems 
directly (something we eventually must do, in any case)? 
Is there not reasonable cause to suspect that the heavy 
drapery of old books in which we wrap ourselves is a 
refuge from thinking for ourselves? For those, like me, 
whose philosophical sensibility inclines toward the past, 
this charge is not lightly dismissed. The students who 
voice it are merely restating the central paradox that we 
have been considering. Philosophy appears in the various 
great works preserved for us from history. Yet, it is a 
fundamentally a-historical activity. How exactly is it, then, 
that philosophy both appears in history and yet is not a 
historical phenomenon in any simple sense? And this 
returns us to our opening question: Is the teaching of past 
thinkers a philosophical activity proper or only an encounter 
with the residue of philosophical activity? 
IV.
Palin ex archēs, Plato’s Socrates would say. Let us return to 
those supposedly obvious first principles from which we 
begin with our own students. Philosophy, we assert, is the 
love of wisdom. Now, wisdom involves knowledge or is a kind 
of knowledge. Certainly, this knowledge has been defined 
differently throughout the history of Western philosophy: 
as a grasp of the Idea of the Good, or a beatific vision of 
the ens perfectissimum, or knowledge of the workings of 
the transcendental Ego, or of the Absolute. Nevertheless, it 
was never merely one more kind of knowledge alongside 
others. The wisdom sought by philosophy, including even 
Kant’s critical philosophy in which reason is supposed to 
uncover its own limits, is not a “body of knowledge,” or a 
“regional” science. Every field of human endeavor requires 
some kind of knowledge: medical, architectural, political, 
etc. In order to apply such knowledge effectively in its 
proper domain we may need to learn and relearn many 
things, but in order to be competent architects or even 
statesmen we do not need to constantly revisit questions 
like “What is knowledge?” or “What explains why the 
world is knowable at all?” This is not true for philosophy, 
which cannot even strive toward its goal (to say nothing 
of achieving it) without seeking a full grounding and 
justification of itself. Hence, philosophy, by its very nature, 
cannot but raise the most comprehensive and radical 
questions—radical in the original meaning of going to the 
radix, the root. We may characterize philosophy, then, as 
comprehensive radicalism (or radical comprehensiveness). 
This characterization is hardly simple or unproblematic, but 
with a flourish, philosophy originated in a transformation of 
traditional mythical thought.
Now, all this is serviceable as far as it goes, except that 
it does not go very far beyond the most rudimentary 
scene setting. On closer examination, in fact, it becomes 
confused. In order for someone to initiate a conceptual 
revolution from within an existing intellectual framework 
(within traditional cosmological myths, say) that person 
must already intuit that this framework has limits. He 
must be in a position to see, for example, that it rests on 
faulty or nonsensical assumptions, that the cosmological 
myths in question are opaque or self-contradictory or point 
beyond themselves. To begin to reach beyond traditional 
cosmological myths, one must already be agitated by a 
dissatisfaction with partial and limited explanations, and 
this entails that one has at least a preliminary conception 
of what comprehensively true explanation would look 
like. In other words, in order to begin to separate from an 
intellectual framework one must, in a crucial sense, already 
be outside it. Philosophy is not the result of a gradual 
distancing from myth. The gradual distancing from myth 
is the result of philosophizing. Thales’ fragments, then, 
are not the “beginning” of philosophy but an extremely 
antique trace of the philosophical impetus at work. Indeed, 
so long as there are rational beings, philosophy cannot 
have its own, absolute, beginning in time. We encounter it 
as something that has always already begun.
Aristotle’s Metaphysics opens with the assertion, “All 
human beings desire by nature to know.” But if this is true 
and we say—as I believe we would be correct to say—that 
the philosophical impulse inheres in the very structure of 
human rationality, it is legitimate to ask why philosophy’s 
past should be in any way dispositive for its present 
activity. If, for example, we are investigating the nature of 
moral obligation, it is certainly worthwhile to know what 
our predecessors had to say about it. This will help in 
formulating questions more incisively and will save us from 
making laughable claims about our originality. But these, 
after all, are instrumental reasons. If we wish to profit from 
thinking along with Kant, Bishop Butler, or Mill, the reading 
can only be ministerial to other, unfinished business. We 
must aim for a maximally accurate phenomenological 
description of practical life and then extract from it a 
definition of morally relevant action (as opposed to 
instinctual reactions, say). We must map and analyze our 
basic moral concepts and the intuitions they express, 
seeking to establish their normative valence and testing 
them to separate the wheat from the chaff. We must try 
to formulate general rules for moral behavior and defend 
these from possible refutation. Description, definition, 
analysis, examination, discernment, argument, refutation—
all of these are expressions of rational work that can take 
place for us only here and now. We may, for example, 
become convinced that Kant’s categorical imperative really 
is the formal structure of any possible moral obligation, but 
this conviction is a philosophical act that takes place in the 
present, even when directed toward past thinkers. 
In this respect, philosophy is analogous to sight. Seeing is 
complete at every moment it occurs. There are, no doubt, 
physiological processes of development and maturation 
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this or that teaching of Plato or Kant, respectively. Usually, 
then, refutation marks a kind of hiatus or caesura between 
one philosophical claim or doctrine, now defunct, and 
another, which takes its place. But this would only serve 
to confirm students in their technological conception of 
change as mere replacement. How do we make them see 
the peculiar character of philosophy that allows it to appear 
variously throughout the flow of history without being 
subsumed in that flow?
The key lies in leading students toward a deeper, more 
reflective level at which refutation, and disagreement more 
generally, are a mark of identity or continuity, i.e., of the 
enduring characteristics of a philosophical milieu, and 
ultimately of philosophical reason itself. That is to say, they 
must learn to see refutations as conceivable at all only thanks 
to shared assumptions about the nature of intelligibility, on 
the one hand, and the nature of philosophy, on the other. 
Interlocutors must share these precisely in order to be able 
to disagree. In a genuinely philosophical argument (which, 
for all we know, may be exceedingly rare), my triumphantly 
pointing out to my interlocutor that his game is up is 
actually my appeal to a shared standard, one which I know 
he accepts. This might be a common doctrinal assumption 
or a rule of formal logic or the overarching philosophical 
commitment to follow logos wherever it leads.9 Ultimately, 
though, the “shared standard” is the basic philosophical 
insight that the world is (at least partly) intelligible and 
that we are striving to articulate this intelligibility. This is 
what the disagreement is actually “about.” To appeal to 
another image, philosophical conversation is warfare, 
but of an utterly unique kind. The “combatants” want to 
conquer, of course. But to the extent that they are genuine 
philosophers, they are altogether more eager to be struck 
down themselves, by the truth.10 The pedagogical task is 
to make the relation between past thinkers into such a 
philosophical conversation, one in which the student is 
trained not only in articulating competing positions, and 
taking sides between them, but in seeing the conversation 
in its underlying, integral wholeness.
I will take Plato and Aristotle as an example. Plato argues 
that form (eidos) is the primary cause of the determinacy 
and intelligibility of beings. The form is the essence of its 
instantiation (i.e., the form Justice enables us to identify 
particular just acts) but form is nevertheless somehow 
separate from its instances. It does not come into being 
and pass away like them. Rather, the instances “imitate” or 
“participate” in their paradigmatic form. 
The fulcrum of Aristotle’s critique is this separation 
(chōrismos in Greek). Aristotle argues that it is senseless 
to claim that the essential being of something is separate 
from that thing of which it is the essence.11 Once this gap 
is opened up, all attempts to traverse it are futile. To call 
the relationship between form and instance “imitation” 
or “participation” is to play with names while explaining 
nothing at all.12
The degree to which Aristotle has done justice to Plato’s 
teaching, and hence the degree to which his critique is 
actually decisive, have been the subjects of a truly ancient 
debate. Let us leave this debate to one side and grant, for 
I find it broadly accurate as a description of the Western 
philosophical tradition.
However, if philosophy is the exercise of reason in its most 
comprehensively radical form, philosophers are human 
beings, necessarily limited and finite. A philosopher is a 
part of the whole, which raises the question of whether 
a part can ever encompass the whole in knowledge. A 
philosopher, moreover, has finite time, in which a definitive 
grounding of reason may prove unattainable.6 It is from 
these “obvious” reflections that we can begin explaining 
the oddity of philosophy’s relation to its history and draw 
some pedagogical consequences. Namely, so long as 
the love of wisdom has not become wisdom simpliciter, 
all philosophers and all philosophical teachings, including 
those that have undoubtedly expanded the horizons of our 
understanding, are doomed to fall short in some way. The 
fate of all philosophical teachings is refutation.7 Refutation, 
however, is nothing other than a reaffirmation of the 
comprehensive radicalism of philosophy.
And here we come to the crux. The competence of the 
scholar is the rigorous explication of philosophical texts 
and doctrines in their specificity and difference from one 
another. This remains true even where the scholar intends 
to show how certain texts are intimately related, or how one 
philosopher prefigures or can only be understood from the 
vantage point of another. Over and above the differences 
between philosophers, however, is the comprehensive 
radicalism that is the same in all of them. Now, in the nature 
of the case, the differences are more apparent than the 
sameness, and it is on these that we focus in our teaching. 
This is why the history of philosophy can sometimes seem 
like a march of intellectual follies, substantiating Cicero’s 
complaint that “there is nothing so absurd that some 
philosopher has not said it.”8 One key to transforming this 
march of follies into reason’s effort at self-understanding 
lies in bringing students to a fuller appreciation of what 
refutation actually is. In the next section, I argue that, up to 
a point, there are practical methods for achieving this in the 
classroom; but only up to a point. In the final analysis, the 
philosophical historian qua teacher requires something that 
is irreducible to professional competence or methodology. 
V.
In the classroom, a student will most often encounter 
refutation as the main engine for philosophical 
transformation. A classic example is the role of thought 
experiments. I articulate what appears to me to be an 
airtight rule for moral judgment applicable in certain 
circumstances. If my interlocutor demolishes the 
appearance of universality or necessary entailment by 
constructing a sufficiently devastating counterexample, 
I am duty-bound to dispense with that rule or argument. 
When one expedient fails, I try another. If the damage 
is more general, I may be compelled to abandon wider 
philosophical commitments. 
The same will hold for a historical class. If I am to teach 
Aristotle or Hegel, for example, I must articulate, in the 
most accurate and forceful terms possible, why each 
thinker believed himself to have superseded his great 
predecessor, to have refuted the sufficiency or finality of 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  TEACHING PHILOSOPHY
PAGE 6 FALL 2017  |  VOLUME 17  |  NUMBER 1
Stated otherwise, effective teaching of historical figures 
in philosophy should require students to go beyond 
those figures, and here teaching the history of philosophy 
differs from teaching history. Certainly, in both cases, the 
first goal is to understand a historical figure and to enter 
into his thought in as objective a manner as possible: 
viz., to understand historical figures as they understood 
themselves. In teaching history, however, we must be 
on guard against judging an historical actor by standards 
entirely alien to the relevant historical context. This cannot 
be the case in quite the same way in philosophy. In focusing 
pedagogical attention on refutation as a sign of philosophical 
continuity, I also train the student to locate, in temporally 
and doctrinally diverse thinkers, evidence of a kind of 
philosophical impetus that does not belong exclusively 
to any thinker. The ultimate goal of this training is not for 
the student to be taught or told, but rather to experience 
what it means to measure particular philosophers against 
the standard of philosophy’s comprehensive radicalness, 
a standard which cannot be identified with any historical 
epoch because it is common to all of them.
VI.
This, however, has far-reaching consequences for the 
efficacy of any pedagogical tool or method. To understand 
any thinker, or the relationship between two thinkers, a 
teacher requires the full complement of scholarly tools: 
mastery of language and historical context, argument 
analysis, logical acumen, etc. In order to expose students 
to the substantial unity underlying all philosophical activity, 
however, there are neither tools nor methods, while 
“competence,” if applicable at all, receives a completely 
transformed meaning. Philosophy is not a technē. Here it 
is primarily a matter of having philosophy’s comprehensive 
desire for wisdom constantly in view. 
Can pedagogical practices create an environment in 
which that desire can be ignited in the student? This is 
akin to asking whether one can motivate students to love 
philosophy. In Nicomachean Ethics X, 7, Aristotle seems 
to think that one can build a non-question-begging case 
for the superiority of the contemplative life by showing, 
in a dialectical manner, how that life takes up into itself, 
and perfects, those things that people ordinarily identify 
with goodness and happiness (power, pleasure, leisure, 
independence, freedom from the vicissitudes of fortune).13 
In an analogous way, I believe, philosophical pedagogy 
must be a demonstration in actu of how philosophy is a 
more complete, more powerful, and more enduring form of 
the same pleasure with which students are already familiar 
through the ordinary, pre-philosophical exercise of their 
cognitive powers, the experience of “getting it right.”
And in fact, the teacher of the history of philosophy, 
specifically, is not lacking in opportunities for just such 
a demonstration, which can be effected by means of a 
controlled “chemical reaction” between philosophical 
texts and a certain prevalent belief system which most of 
our students take in cum lacte. That system has several 
salient elements. First, there is the distinctive temporal 
phenomenology I discussed earlier. Related to this is a 
pious, if largely uninformed, faith in “science” (usually a 
somewhat hasty concoction of some physical materialism 
the sake of argument, that the critique is convincing and 
that Aristotle’s form/matter distinction and his concepts of 
energeia and dynamis succeed where Plato fails. Has Plato’s 
account been replaced or discarded? In one respect it has, 
and this would normally be the pedagogical focus. That is, 
I will point out to students the dilemmas raised by Plato’s 
account of the basic structure of intelligibility. We will then 
discuss why Aristotle thinks he moves our understanding 
forward or why we can at least claim that he prepares the 
way for later advances, by having the good sense to see 
that essence must be discoverable in the world and so on. 
Just like the standard chronology that begins with Thales, 
this account is sufficient to the moment for an introductory 
class, but it skates over the deeper dynamic at play. In an 
advanced class, with a smaller number of students and thus 
room for a more expansive discussion, the focus can and 
should be elsewhere. Both thinkers, after all, agree about 
the causal primacy of form in explaining what it means to 
be something determinate (i.e., their disagreement is not 
about the existence and causal importance of form, but 
about its mode of being). More importantly, Aristotle also 
shares Plato’s conviction that the world is intelligible and his 
view of the types of questions that this intelligibility imposes 
on us. In fact, it is only because of this shared basis, which 
is altogether more fundamental than their differences, that 
Aristotle could set out to refute his teacher in the first place. 
For this reason there can be no doubt that he is doing justice 
to the deeper impulse behind the Platonic position as he 
refutes, or perhaps even misinterprets, it. That position and 
its Aristotelian negation manifest how philosophy remains 
identical to itself throughout the variegated history of its 
doctrinal appearances. The student should come to see 
how, through refutation, philosophical thinking constantly 
crucifies and resurrects itself in one and the same act. 
Now, the teacher must, of course, present all the doctrinal 
details of the Platonic hypothesis or of Aristotle’s critique and 
test students’ grasp of these details. But, at some point, the 
student must undergo the experience of discovering and 
articulating the continuity of philosophical commitments 
and intentions beneath the multiplicity of details. In 
advanced seminars, this is an excellent assignment for an 
oral presentation following on the study of the relevant 
passages from Aristotle’s Metaphysics. It has also served 
me well as a question prompt for an unorthodox writing 
assignment: “What assumptions about the nature of being 
and the nature of thinking must Plato and Aristotle share in 
order for it to be possible for them to disagree about the 
nature of form?” 
Another example: In an upper-level undergraduate seminar 
on Hegel, the mid-semester paper asked students to 
explain how (i) Kant’s conception of moral law and (ii) 
Hegel’s strictures, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, against 
the formalism of that conception, both expressed certain 
uniquely modern convictions about the status of self-
consciousness. Having thought through this question, 
students then prepared oral arguments debating (at a much 
higher level than they otherwise could have achieved) 
whether Hegel or Kant succeeds better in substantiating 
their shared insight about normativity as the product of 
self-conscious legislation by rational actors. 
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In all these cases, we overcome—if only for a moment—the 
student’s linear and merely cumulative sense of time and 
convert the teaching of historical texts into a conversation 
with direct implications for his or her life. We do so not 
by making those texts “relevant” to students’ lives, but by 
forcing on them the opposite (and, in my estimation, much 
more profound) question: Are their lives and opinions 
relevant, when viewed from the radical and comprehensive 
standpoint aimed at by philosophical thought? When the 
philosophical text is deployed in this way, it finds an ally 
in the natural adventurousness of youth, and the pleasure 
youth feels in being liberated from the merely given and 
familiar. 
Clearly, however, not everyone will experience this 
particular form of liberation as pleasurable. Many students 
regularly find it less enticing than other pleasures, or even 
intolerable. Nor is there a recipe for which texts to choose 
and how to deploy them that can be easily replicated by any 
teacher. These well-known facts of life bring us up against 
what I hinted at earlier: the outer limits of all method when 
dealing with a subject like philosophy. 
Without in any way meaning to undercut the practical 
lessons set forth above, there are—at the deepest stratum 
of philosophical education—no “models” for achieving 
desired “learning outcomes” nor “metrics” for enhancing 
the effectiveness of the teacher. Teaching the history of 
philosophy becomes philosophical most fully only when the 
teacher is actively philosophizing, that is, when he or she 
is gripped entirely by the question: “Could this thinker be 
right about the highest and most comprehensive matters?” 
To expect otherwise, to seek first to teach the history of 
philosophy and then engage in “real” philosophizing, is 
akin to Hegel’s example of the fellow who is determined 
to learn how to swim before getting wet.16 And, for similar 
reasons, a student will really grasp the trans-historical 
unity of philosophical eros behind the bewildering variety 
of positions and doctrines only when he or she is already 
seized by that same eros—the surest mark of philosophically 
inclined spirit. It is thus a pedagogical achievement of 
great philosophical significance to recognize when, and 
why, method must finally yield the floor to nature.
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NOTES
1. Why? Because for Aristotle, matter is not an independently 
understandable concept, as much modern philosophy seems 
to assume. It can be understood, if at all, only in relation to 
form. Taken by itself, matter is something exists only en logōi, 
in our thinking, and specifically in the act of abstracting from 
all the identifiable properties of some determinate being. 
Similarly, “body” is a radically ambiguous term for Aristotle, 
since there is a fundamental difference between a natural self-
organizing body and other bodies. Natural self-organized bodies 
are ensouled, and it is the soul which is both the principle of 
nutrition and maintenance of the living body and the principle 
of many of the activities we call “mental” (such as perception, 
sans any real awareness of the full consequences of 
quantum mechanics, a dash of evolutionary biology, and a 
staunch neurological focus on the mind as “what the brain 
does”). Lastly, there is an almost universal, and initially 
unconquerable, conviction that ethical judgments are, 
at bottom, strictly relative to an individual or a society. In 
trying to make students aware of this system of beliefs 
as only a system of beliefs, I have found certain (perhaps 
unexpected and often ignored) Greek texts to be highly 
effective agents of philosophical sedition.14
Of course, a teacher owes his students a philologically and 
historically sound account of philosophical texts and this 
means, at a bare minimum, avoiding crudely anachronistic 
readings which fish around in those texts to find an 
immediate, “contemporary relevance” which is often not 
there. Happily, though, in the case of historical examples 
of first-rate philosophical power, “contemporary relevance” 
is irrelevant. They can serve as a direct challenge to 
contemporary doxa precisely by virtue of their remoteness 
and foreignness. Herewith, some examples, all from an 
undergraduate, introductory context.
For Aristotle, “nature” (physis) is not simply everything that 
is. It is a term of distinction, arrived at by contrasting natural 
with artificial beings.15 In teaching these passages in the 
Physics, I ask students whether Aristotle would even agree 
that the contemporary physicist, who applies mathematical 
laws that are necessarily blind to the difference between 
natural and artificial beings, is actually studying nature at 
all. Invariably, this question leaves them flummoxed since 
they assume either (i) that Aristotle was simply staggering 
about in a pre-modern fog or (ii) that he was trying to do 
what our science does but at an amateur level dictated 
by his primitive mathematics and hopeless experimental 
machinery. That Aristotle might be in a position to mount a 
critique of the fundamental ontological and methodological 
assumptions of our standpoint is utterly perverse to them—
exactly the reaction the teacher should want.
In introductory classes, I never fail to teach the passage 
in the Nicomachean Ethics that treats greatness of soul 
(megalopsychia), the odd virtue concerned with desiring 
honors. First-year students are baffled to learn that humility, 
for Aristotle, is not an ethical virtue—a perfect starting 
point for a discussion in which they are forced to justify 
why humility seems to them so obviously a positive trait. A 
similar dynamic can be extracted from Books II and III of the 
Republic in which Socrates undertakes his shockingly frank 
and ruthless purge of all poetry and music. Everyone is 
familiar with the pedagogic effect of Socrates’ declaration, 
in the Apology, that “the unexamined life is not worth living 
for a human being.” Less familiar, but superbly effective, is 
the use of Socratic censorship in order to force students to 
justify their own assumptions about freedom of expression. 
Socrates justifies censorship with an account of human 
flourishing in which the unity of the polis plays the central 
role. Of course, we together with our students believe 
nearly unfettered freedom of expression and publication 
is good. But good for what, exactly? And according to what 
conception of human nature and human flourishing? Which 
conception, Socrates’ or ours, is truer to the facts of our 
nature as we experience those facts? 
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15. “Of the things which are, some are by nature and others through 
other causes…” See Physics, B, I, 192b8-13.
16. G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia Logic, §10 and §41A1.
“Philosophy That Is Ancient”: Teaching 
Ancient Philosophy in Context
Nickolas Pappas
CITY COLLEGE AND THE GRADUATE CENTER, THE CITY 
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
“Ancient philosophy is philosophy that is ancient.” I have 
taught a course in ancient philosophy almost every year for 
the last thirty years. Lately I’ve taken to beginning it with 
this sentence, cribbed from other pedagogical tautologies.1
The truism about philosophy that is ancient is my 
way of bringing students into the double experience, 
hermeneutically speaking, of reading the pre-Socratics, 
Plato, and Aristotle. Ancient philosophy really is philosophy, 
which is to say that it confronts topics of perennial interest 
at the level of generality we associate with philosophy that 
is not ancient, and deploys many of the argumentative and 
interpretive methods found in contemporary philosophy. 
Ancient philosophy is philosophy (and we use the present 
tense of the verb “to be” in saying so) as ancient weather 
is weather, and as ancient architecture and geometry are 
architecture and geometry.
But we also speak in the past tense. This is what philosophy 
was. In archaic and classical Greece, philosophy was 
materialist cosmology or Sophistic ethics. We distinguish 
ancient philosophy as ancient by virtue of its differences 
from later traditions: differences in scientific knowledge, 
in religious thought and practices, in political and social 
assumptions, etc. Its antiquity creates a distance. At the 
introductory level as well as the scholarly, reading ancient 
philosophers calls for historical contextualization that goes 
beyond anything we do with Descartes or Hobbes, or even 
with Aquinas or Anselm.
Reading ancient philosophy is a double game, in other 
words, and some doubleness enters fruitfully even into 
a student’s first glimpse of the subject. Socrates is our 
contemporary as an inquirer into matters of human life and 
death—but also an antiquarian figure dressed in clothes 
we can hardly imagine, observing the rules of an etiquette 
that no one today lives by.
Add to the interpretive predicament the very mundane 
difficulty of students entering a course like this one 
unprepared to move back and forth between ancient and 
modern contexts. The mundane difficulty has increased 
for me over the years, as it may have increased for other 
people who teach ancient philosophy. At the City College of 
New York, my course has evolved (for a collection of good 
reasons) from serving philosophy majors to functioning as 
a general graduation requirement, and to some degree 
as one of my department’s introductions to philosophy. I 
now routinely have one hundred students in the classroom, 
most of them arriving without backgrounds in philosophy. 
mental representation, and thinking). From an Aristotelian point 
of view, then, the mind-body problem only becomes a problem 
by ignoring the unique status of natural, ensouled bodies 
and redefining all bodies as inert mass-points, at which point 
the anguished question arises of how body thus understood 
relates to mind thus understood—i.e., as something completely 
discontinuous with body. This is a perfect example of how the 
study of ancient texts, approached properly, can be a critical 
enterprise directed at modernity, rather than merely a doxastic 
museum tour of the past. For more on this, see p. 7.
2. Hobbes, Leviathan, I, iv, 13: “By this it appears how necessary 
it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge, to examine 
the definitions of former authors, and either to correct them 
when they are negligently set down or to make them himself. 
For the errors of definitions multiply themselves according as 
the reckoning proceeds, and lead men into absurdities, which 
at last they see, but cannot avoid without reckoning anew from 
the beginning, in which lies the foundation of their errors. From 
whence it happens that they which trust to books do as they 
that cast up many little sums into a greater, without considering 
whether those little sums were rightly cast up or not; and at last 
finding the error visible, and not mistrusting their first grounds, 
know not which way to clear themselves but spend their time 
fluttering over their books as birds that, entering by the chimney 
and finding themselves enclosed in a chamber, flutter at the 
false light of a glass window, for want of wit to consider which 
way they came in.” Note that in the 1668 Latin version of this 
passage, those “first grounds” which Hobbes intimates are 
untrustworthy are the Magistrorum principiis (“the principles of 
their teachers”).
3. Martin Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” in Vorträge und 
Aufsätze (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann, 2000), 8-9 and 14–20. In 
English, see The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 
5-6 and 13–19.
4. This, of course, is not to deny that some philosophers will 
explicitly claim to have replaced and made obsolete an earlier 
form of thinking. Such claims were especially characteristic of 
the early modern philosophical struggle against the scholastics. 
One thinks here of Hobbes or Descartes as examples. But, of 
course, in teaching such philosophers we cannot take such a 
claim at face value. It must be thought through and challenged.
5. Metaphysics, A, 3, 983b6-27. And cf. Simplicius’ testimony: 
“Thales is reported to be the first to reveal the investigation of 
nature to the Greeks,” cited in The Pre-Socratic Philosophers, ed. 
G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983), 86.
6. This is how I understand the gnomic, but profound, statement 
attributed to Alcmaeon: “Human beings die for this reason, that 
they cannot join the beginning to the end.” Aristotle, Problemata, 
XVII, 3, 916a33.
7. Or, at least, emendation or qualification. But these only serve to 
highlight the main point, viz., that this or that teaching is not yet 
wisdom.
8. Nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo 
philosophorum. Cicero, De Divinatione, II, 58, 119.
9. Cf. Heraclitus’ fragments 22B1, 22B2, and 22B50 in Hermann 
Diels and Walter Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 3 vols, 
6th edition (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951-1952).
10. See Plato, Gorgias, 505e4-5. While I cannot argue for it fully here, 
I believe it demonstrable that this applies even to what purports 
to be a frontal assault, such as we find in Nietzsche, on traditional 
philosophical rationalism tout court.
11. Metaphysics, A, 9, 991b1-2. This chapter contains a detailed 
critique of what Aristotle took to be the doctrine of Ideas.
12. Metaphysics, A, 6, 987b7-14, and 9, 991a20-22.
13. This is why Aristotle can simply assert that the theoretical 
life is happiness and that “this has already been said,” even 
though this is the first time he actually says it. Chapter 7 is his 
demonstration that the superiority of the theoretical life “seems 
to be in agreement with what has been said and with the truth.” 
Ethica Nicomachea, X, 7, 1177a12-b26.
14. The history of philosophy can doubtless provide numerous other 
examples, but I prefer to speak whereof I know.
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It is hard to be certain which treatises in the Hippocratic 
corpus would have been part of medical theory during the 
lifetimes of Socrates and Plato. Over a period of centuries, 
the corpus acquired works all of which came to be 
associated with Hippocrates. Plato knew something about 
Hippocrates (see a mention at Protagoras 311b-c as well as 
a statement of medical method at Phaedrus 270c-e), but we 
hesitate to assign dates to most of the treatises.5 Two works 
that do seem to come early, however, are On the Sacred 
Disease and On Ancient Medicine. The former is a short 
account of epilepsy that can look refreshingly scientific to 
the modern reader for its refusal to call epilepsy any more 
sacred than any other disease (chapter 1). Epilepsy begins 
in the brain, the author insists (chapter 17). Reading this 
work, one wants to make Hippocratic medicine a standard 
for knowledge. But the confidence with which its author 
attributes epilepsy to phlegm at work in the brain (chapter 
18) foretells a long tradition of medical inquiry misled by 
this theory of humors that stands at such a remove from 
experience. 
This is not to condemn the Hippocratics but rather to say 
that however we interpret the work, On the Sacred Disease 
opens up the Socratic technê analogy. The treatise On 
Ancient Medicine, also likely to date from this time, dwells 
on the question of what makes medicine a technê (chapter 
3), and so also might enter the process of understanding 
Socrates. (Phaedrus 270c-e might even be a reference to 
that work.)
The students’ questions that I have referred to might have 
come out of no more than idle curiosity. But their specificity 
convinced me that I had been presenting ancient authors 
in the classroom without enough background information. 
I started moving consciously toward learning more about 
the political, scientific, and social history that we need 
for understanding our ancient authors, and then bringing 
what I’d learned into the classroom. Now I teach Plato 
and Aristotle amid details of political, scientific, and social 
history. Not only how the Athenians governed themselves 
and what cities they warred against, but every other aspect 
of their lives as well, is welcome. What did their doctors 
do? What did people wear? Where did they go on a free 
afternoon, and what did they do there? Diet, religious 
practice, romantic love, and physical labor are all important 
to our conceptions of our own lives today. And my gamble 
(when I brought the subjects into the classroom) was that 
seeing the persons of the ancient world as people who 
cared about comparable things would help my students 
see the names in their books as concrete persons. Even as 
a more detailed description of the ancient world situates 
Socrates in a setting very different from our own, it might 
help to bring out something of his ordinariness as well.
Aristotle and science. Before moving on to my main 
examples, which come from Plato, let me qualify what I am 
saying in connection with Aristotle. Daily life does not enter 
his writings as it enters Plato’s. We possess none of Aristotle’s 
dialogues, so we are less likely to find in him the details to 
be elaborated that we see everywhere in Plato. This is no 
reason to give up on the larger world when we come to 
Aristotle’s writings, but it might be a reason to include some 
of his biological writings, even in an introductory course, 
Even passing details about “the porch of the king archon” 
or Aristotle’s inquiry into “that for the sake of which 
something happens” threaten to make the philosophy in 
the course resemble a museum piece. Worse than that, 
such reminders of the differences between then and now 
threaten to make philosophy as such, all philosophy, look 
not like an ongoing and widespread human activity, but 
something that a few people used to do.
Now, when it comes to antiquity itself, my experience is 
that students find information about the ancient world 
interesting—more interesting than we assume—and over 
the past decade I have altered my teaching of ancient 
philosophy to immerse students in the daily life of the 
antiquity that gave birth to that philosophy. This is the 
single greatest change I’ve made in my teaching method, 
and I believe it engages students in their reading of ancient 
philosophy. The only problem, practically speaking, is the 
question of how much class time can be devoted to readings 
and topics that are not strictly philosophical. Pedagogically, 
the question is what philosophical value such teaching has. 
When is a detail about ancient life significant to the reading 
of philosophy, and when is it just local color?
Student questions. It was questions from students that 
originally prompted me to say more about the ancient 
world when teaching ancient philosophy. Some of those 
questions sound trivial. One year we had reached the end 
of Plato’s Phaedo and the last words Socrates said: “We 
owe a cock to Asclepius” (118a).2 (It is a weighty utterance; 
it inspired Nietzsche’s merciless remark that Socrates 
considered life a disease.3) A student asked: “So they had 
chickens?” I’d never thought to ask. It wouldn’t make a 
difference to the significance of those last words, but I was 
struck that someone would want to know the answer.
In another class the topic was Socrates’ craft analogy, his 
practice (in some dialogues) of making technê “profession, 
skill, craft” the paradigm for knowledge. Socrates would 
press people to see whether they understood what they 
said as shoemakers understood how to make shoes or as 
doctors understand sickness and health. One student called 
out, “What did doctors know in Socrates’ time?” Another 
one added, “What did shoemakers know?” We speculated 
together about apprenticeship and debated how much the 
answer would matter.
In this case what does matter are the differences between 
the two professions. On one ancient view of the physician, 
a doctor should be comparable to a shoemaker: knowing 
certain techniques and the results they would have. But 
the practice of medicine was divided, in a way that would 
lead to debates in later antiquity, between the doctors who 
confined themselves to empirically demonstrated methods 
for alleviating symptoms, and those who purported 
(“dogmatically,” as their opponents said) to account for 
disease and the functioning body with theories of humors 
and oppositions between hot and cold, wet and dry.4 
Shoemakers did not claim to think cosmologically about 
the true nature of the shoe—Plato mocks the very idea of 
their learning philosophy (Theaetetus 180d)—so we have 
reason to question whether the technê analogy can offer a 
univocal image of knowledge.
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historical context. For even though some of the dialogue’s 
serpentine arguments are hard to translate into concrete 
English, the conclusion is clear in every language, as is 
the idea of philosophical life that the conclusion implies. 
The Lysis’s main conversation is about philia—“friendship” 
in the most common rendering, or “affection”(but often 
applying where “friendship” does not). Socrates and his 
teenage interlocutors try to determine what philia is and 
how it comes into existence. Whether they begin with the 
premise that “like is friend to like” or, instead, that “unlike is 
friend to unlike,” they fail at achieving the theory they want. 
Then Lysis and Menexenus, the boys that Socrates has been 
talking to, have to go home. Socrates has the last word:
“Now,” I said, “Lysis and Menexenus, we’ve made 
ourselves ridiculous, both I an old man and you. 
For when these others go away they’ll say that we 
consider ourselves one another’s friends—I put 
myself with the two of you—but we haven’t been 
able to discover what the friend is.” (223b)
I translate the last clause as literally as possible to bring 
forward its provocation. We don’t know what we’re talking 
about and yet we help ourselves to impressive words. It is 
common to accuse a disloyal friend of not knowing what it 
is to be a friend, and to confess you hadn’t known what love 
was until one great love came along. Likewise we speak of 
coming to know or failing to know what courage, grace, 
courtesy, anger, or greed is like. The Socratic provocation 
consists in claiming that we achieve such knowledge—that 
we can only achieve such knowledge—through the process 
of defining our terms. 
The Lysis begins a long way from that challenge to 
existence, and I want to focus on those opening pages 
to suggest how much an instructor can draw out of the 
dialogue’s beginning in the classroom. 
Socrates is walking, outside the city walls, from one 
Athenian gymnasium to another, from the Academy to the 
Lyceum (203a). He sees Hippothales8 and other young men 
near a palaistra “wrestling-room, wrestling school” and 
they all propose going in (204a). Socrates learns that there 
are good-looking younger boys inside, including Lysis 
whom Hippothales is infatuated with (204b). Hippothales 
has been writing songs about Lysis’s father, Democrates, 
and about his grandfather, Lysis (204d).
They enter to find that Lysis and his friends have completed 
their sacrifice to Hermes and are now sitting, nicely dressed, 
around a game of knucklebones (206e). Socrates begins 
his conversation with Lysis and his friend Menexenus. As 
a warm-up, and to show Hippothales how one wins a boy 
over, he asks Lysis what liberties his parents allow him 
(207e-210d). The family’s mule-driver, not Lysis, drives 
the mule cart, even though the mule-driver is a slave 
(208b). Another household slave is his tutor (208c). So how 
(Socrates asks) can Lysis consider himself free and not 
enslaved (207e, 208e)?
Reading these few pages of the Lysis along with my 
students, I add conversational footnotes along these lines 
to the beginning of the dialogue:
alongside his logical, ethical, and metaphysical works. This 
is because in a way Aristotle’s biological writings offer the 
best opportunity of all for seeing where the ancient world 
lies far from ours and where it touches ours. Sometimes 
Aristotle generalizes about animal life or medical principles 
based on what he himself encountered when he spent a 
few years on the island of Lesbos and where he catalogued 
the land and sea animals he found there. A recent book, 
The Lagoon, by Armand Marie Leroi, returns to the lagoon 
on Lesbos that still contains many of the marine species 
Aristotle observed. Unlike shoes, schools, and social clubs, 
the fish and fowl of today are the fish and fowl of Aristotle’s 
time. “His favorite animal,” Leroi writes, “was that weirdly 
intelligent invertebrate, the cuttlefish.”6  Leroi’s expertise 
at returning to an Aristotelian species with a contrasting 
modern description shows another way to keep ancient 
philosophy both accurately ancient and philosophically 
contemporary.
Aristotle also plays a part in C. R. S. Harris’s work on ancient 
theories of circulation, a work that looks at the heart and 
blood vessels as they were described by Aristotle, Galen, 
and other ancients.7 But I should say that Harris treats 
the cardiovascular anatomy in greater detail than most 
nonexpert readers have the patience for. I am grateful for 
his expertise, but I would not assign this book to a student.
Plato’s Lysis. Among the works of Plato, there are some 
that almost always find their way into the classroom. The 
defense speech of Socrates in the Apology has obvious 
appeal and significance, and its portrayal of moments 
in the life of Socrates leads easily to talk about the 
Peloponnesian War and the subsequent tyranny in Athens, 
all of which informs the question of how philosophy can 
coexist with democratic culture. But the speech also leads 
to more prosaic matters. Socrates proposes a fine he can 
pay (38b), and we need to say what those amounts mean 
in modern currency. He compares himself to a foreigner in 
the courtroom (17d), and it is worth asking what kinds of 
foreigners did live in Athens, and what kind of lives they 
lived.
But Socrates is on trial for his life in the Apology. This is not 
the place to observe him in the midst of ordinary existence. 
Longer dialogues like the Protagoras and Symposium 
set the stage for Socratic conversations so extensively 
that a class could happily move at a slow pace through 
one of those dialogues and not miss a detail. To make 
my point about teaching Plato, however, I prefer those 
slices of philosophical life in which Socrates turns casual 
conversations into incipient theorizing: the Alcibiades 
I, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, 
Laches, and Lysis. Especially in their opening moments, 
these dialogues communicate glimpses of daily life as it 
took place in a city like Athens before Alexander reshaped 
the political and cultural landscape. And because they are 
all short, these dialogues move quickly into the heart of 
their philosophical inquiries so the student can get both a 
snapshot of ancient life and an abstruse conceptual tangle 
in a single night’s reading.
The Lysis contains both sides of ancient philosophy as I 
have been talking about it. In one way it doesn’t need any 
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the object of love, and the younger adolescent 
boy he pursued who, according to the stereotype, 
could never be an adult. Because the object of love 
played a passive role in this pursuit, and because 
Greek men had to represent themselves as active 
parties, there was some ambivalence surrounding 
these romances. The younger partners had to 
make at least a show of resisting the older men’s 
attentions. 
•	 Primary sources include Plato’s Symposium 
and Aeschines’ Against Timarchus, a courtroom 
speech against an Athenian citizen on the 
grounds of his past as a prostitute.
•	 As Dover’s pioneering work has already 
shown, there is evidence to be collected from 
every part of both Greek life and Greek art to 
inform our understanding of ancient male-
male relationships; Halperin, Davidson, and 
Winkler round out and qualify some of Dover’s 
conclusions.12
•	 Hippothales	writing	songs. I like this tidbit about 
Hippothales composing songs for the very specific 
light in which it casts Greek homosexuality, 
making the ancient romantic relationships look 
similar to modern ones in some ways and distinctly 
different in others. The anecdote cited here tells 
against an excessively “anthropological” reading 
of ancient homosexuality according to which the 
relationships were based on “coming-of-age” 
rituals. There may well have been initiation rites 
behind Greek pederasty, but ritual practices do 
not call for individualized strategies of seduction. 
Hippothales is in love. And then, as now, there 
is no more reliable impetus to song-writing than 
unrequited love. But while such songwriting today 
is expected to be about the loved one, I am hard-
pressed to name one love song written during my 
lifetime that celebrates the athletic achievement of 
the loved one’s parents or grandparents.13
•	 Lysis,	 the	 grandfather	 of	 Lysis. This one is a 
small detail. Students sometimes wonder where 
ancient Greek names came from. According to one 
dominant custom, the first boy in a family would 
be named after his father’s father, as Lysis was.
•	 Hermes. Athenian gymnasia, and perhaps many 
around Greece, had three statues of their governing 
deities: Heracles, Eros, and Hermes. Heracles was 
an obvious choice given his legendary strength, 
and the connections between athletic culture and 
romantic love made Eros a natural choice as well. 
But Hermes, a god with numerous functions, is 
harder to pin down. Does his inclusion, and the 
performance of a prayer in this dialogue, attest to 
the intellectual side of life at the gym? 
•	 It is hard to know where to begin reading 
about ancient religion given that (unlike some 
of these topics) it has been studied by scholars 
•	 outside	 the	 city	walls. Athens included both the 
walled city and considerable countryside outside 
those walls. It is easy to focus on urban life, 
but many Athenians lived in villages in the Attic 
countryside; others may have lived on their land 
in family farms. (Victor Hanson’s work has done 
much to fill in our sense of Athenian rural life.9) 
And we can already raise one obvious question 
about Socrates. How is he able to pass his days far 
from any workplace, given the popular portrayal of 
him as a poor man? 
•	 from	Academy	to	Lyceum. This reference touches 
on the exhaustively discussed topic of ancient 
Greek athletics. By the time of Socrates, many 
Greek cities had public places devoted to exercise 
and athletics. There seem to have been three main 
gymnasia at Athens: the Academy, the Lyceum, 
and the Cynosarges. It has widely been noted that 
Plato founded his school at the first of these and 
Aristotle later made the second one his own school. 
(Later testimony tells us the Cynics got their name 
from the Cynosarges.) Plato cannot have intended 
a joke about Socrates drifting from Platonic into 
Aristotelian studies, because although he may 
well have founded the Academy before writing the 
Lysis, the Lyceum did not become a philosophical 
school until after his death.
•	 palaistra. We are still in the domain of athletics. 
A palaistra was not a gumnasion. These smaller 
institutions appeared in many cities, as gymnasia 
did, although unlike the public gymnasium, a 
palaistra apparently could be privately owned. 
A younger crowd exercised here. That Socrates 
carries on a discussion on these grounds reinforces 
our sense that Athenian philosophers linked their 
enterprise with physical exercise. 
•	 Passages in Plato’s Charmides, Euthydemus, 
and Theaetetus suggest the popularity 
of gymnastic spaces among friends of 
Socrates. Ancient sources about athletics 
include Philostratus Gymnasticus and Lucian 
Anacharsis. For selections from other primary 
sources, Miller’s Arete is the sourcebook to 
consult.10
•	 Excellent secondary sources include Kyle, 
Miller, and Scanlon.11
•	 Hippothales	 infatuated	with	Lysis. Given that the 
motivating force behind Socrates’ conversation with 
Lysis is said to be the infatuation that Hippothales 
has, there is no reading the Lysis without 
discussing ancient Greek same-sex love, another 
broad topic with (these days, after a long period 
of the opposite) an extensive bibliography. Plato’s 
Symposium and Phaedrus are incomprehensible 
without some explanation of these ancient same-
sex customs. In connection with the Lysis, essential 
facts include the difference in age between the 
man (often a young-enough man) who pursued 
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•	 Primary sources again include Plato. He gives 
one slave a rare speaking part in the Meno 
when Socrates leads that slave through a 
geometrical proof. And to the extent that his 
dialogues dramatize philosophical theory’s 
emergence out of quotidian conversation, 
the recurring appearance of slaves in 
these quotidian settings makes the most 
powerful suggestion we have of their place 
in Athenian life. See the opening scenes of 
Aristophanes’ Wasps, Knights, and Frogs for 
other representations of slaves. Aristophanes 
has the advantage of letting himself depict the 
most mundane elements of life, although the 
fact that he plays scenes for laughs limits the 
historical use we can make of those scenes 
as evidence. Surely, the necessity of slavery 
to the culture’s existence helps to explain 
Aristotle’s defense of the practice (Politics I, 
1253b14-1255b40), although such a defense 
was unusual even in his own time and might 
have been heard with embarrassment.
•	 For contemporary discussions, see, first of all, 
Finley, who initiated the scholarly discussion 
of ancient slavery. Works by Garlan and de Ste-
Croix are thorough and, though controversial 
in places, necessary reading. For a most recent 
work, see duBois, who insightfully calls Greek 
slaves both ubiquitous and invisible.17
In speaking of the Lysis as I am doing here, more or less 
spying its arguments from the periphery, I do not mean to 
play down the dialogue’s arguments. I am only assuming 
that an instructor knows how to follow the Socratic 
conversation through its logical turns, and will be doing 
so after having situated that conversation in the Athenian 
wrestling room. Those in search of a guide to the arguments 
themselves may consult, for example, Penner and Rowe.18
Historical information in the philosophical classroom. 
We are back at the question of what makes this history 
philosophical. I pointed out that some Hippocratic treatises, 
which you might think belong in the history of science, 
illuminate the Socratic analogy between knowledge and 
technê. There will be student questions, and informed 
answers to them, that end up providing no more than local 
color. But it is not always clear in advance what will be 
merely local color and what is philosophically significant.
Take the biographical detail that Socrates walked around 
Athens barefoot (Phaedrus 229a, Symposium 174a). Is 
this proof of his poverty? If so, it would make a mystery 
of the fact that he has so much leisure time and knows 
so many aristocratic Athenians. At one time Socrates’ lover 
was Alcibiades, the foster son of Athens’s de facto political 
leader. Athenian culture would have to have been highly 
democratic to permit such class-crossing, and Socrates 
would have to have been not only poor but ungrateful not 
to acknowledge his good luck in living in such a democracy.
More likely, Socrates went barefoot not out of poverty but 
out of personal preference. Do we want to say he was being 
for centuries. And students may already know 
something about ancient religious beliefs and 
practices. Still it’s worth having sources on 
hand. Along with only three other gods (Zeus, 
Poseidon, Athena), Hermes joins in much of 
the action of Homer’s Odyssey, which affords 
us a good first profile of this divinity. Homeric 
Hymn 4 To Hermes tells the story of the god’s 
birth.
•	 Among recent secondary sources, Burkert’s 
Greek Religion is the acknowledged authority. 
See also books by Buxton, Mikalson, and 
Zaidman and Pantel. On Hermes specifically 
(but also on mythology generally) Vernant is 
both a necessity and a pleasure to consult.14
•	 nicely	 dressed. Socrates (as narrator) tells us 
that Lysis and the other boys were “done up” 
attractively. (The contrast with Socrates’ own 
appearance goes without saying.) This is a point at 
which a reader may ask what Athenians wore when 
they were “nicely dressed.” When exercising, they 
wore nothing; but what was the attire of a man of 
property? For an answer, see the following:
•	 Scattered anecdotes in Herodotus’s Histories 
and an atypical passage in Thucydides’ 
Peloponnesian War (1.6), both of which create 
a first impression, as does a speech by Persia’s 
Queen Atossa in Aeschylus’s Persians (lines 
176-196). 
•	 On Athenian clothing of the time, Geddes; on 
nudity, Bonfante.15
•	 knucklebones. This one is a small detail too, and not 
much information is available, but knucklebones 
apparently could be thrown like dice. 
•	 For available facts about board games in 
antiquity, see Kurke.16
•	 household	slaves. I emphasize this point because 
although in one way modern American society is 
highly sensitive to mentions of slavery, in another 
respect references to slavery in literature from 
the distant past tend to be taken for granted as 
something that was done “back then.” But even 
a mention of slaves in ancient sources, such as 
these asides in a conversation that is putatively 
about Lysis’s minority status, suggests how large a 
role slaves played in Greek society and economy. 
Although many cultures owned slaves in ancient, 
medieval, and early modern periods, they differed 
widely in the degrees to which they depended 
on slaves. Like the U.S. South before the Civil 
War, and like a few other times and places—but 
unlike many or most—Greek and Roman antiquity 
relied on slavery. Slaves amounted to one-fifth or 
more of the population, they were essential to the 
production of food, and they were omnipresent in 
urban life. 
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Back to the Lysis: philia, athletics, and slavery. What is local 
color for readers of the Lysis, and what is philosophically 
significant?
I think that just about everyone will agree on the necessity 
of knowing what the Greek word “philia” means and whom 
to call a “philos.” No sound interpretation of the Lysis can 
ignore the question of how best to render its subject in 
English.
Although “friendship” and “fondness” and even “liking” do 
capture much of the semantic field of philia, that semantic 
field also has broader applications. “Philia” is the most 
natural word in classical Greek for the feeling that parents 
and children have for one another, and one spouse for the 
other. “Friendship” has a forced sound in the latter case 
and is controversial in the other (having your children as 
your friends). The Republic calls one who loves an artistic 
spectacle a “philotheamôn” (“lover of sights”) (5.475d), 
whereas we naturally call ourselves music-lovers but rarely, 
or only awkwardly, “friends” of music. 
There is, however, a way in which the words “friend” and 
“friendship” fit right in with the discussion in the Lysis, a 
way which returns to the erotic or romantic sense of the 
philos: no words are more automatic to our romantic lives 
than “girlfriend” and “boyfriend.” With such examples, 
and others we can draw from Books 8 and 9 of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics, we preface our reading of the Lysis. 
Taking the translation of philia as an unproblematic 
case of non-philosophical information that matters to 
a philosophical reading, consider two aspects of the 
Lysis’s opening scene that I discussed above. First there 
is athletics. Not only did Socrates frequent the gyms and 
wrestling-rooms of Athens, but those places seem to have 
been considered natural sites for philosophical exchange. 
The philosophers who founded schools in or near gymnasia 
drew on the existing pedagogical aspect of gym culture. 
Thanks to them, but really thanks to their understanding 
of athleticism, three modern words for educational 
institutions have come down to us from the gymnasia of 
Athens.24 It is worth remembering that it was not a Socratic 
philosopher but rather Isocrates, a student of Gorgias and 
a very different type of intellectual, who first spelled out 
the parallel between gymnastic training for the body and 
philosophy for the soul.25
Even more established in Athenian thought, as well as in 
Greek cities outside Athens, was the connection between 
athletic spaces and romantic encounters. The earliest 
evidence for love at the gym dates from a century before 
Socrates, when the archaic poet Theognis wrote, in lines 
now often quoted, “Happy is the one who exercises while 
he loves and comes back home to sleep all day with a 
good-looking boy.”26 To emphasize the connection among 
such uses of the athletic space, Plato has Socrates perform 
his cross-examination as an example of seduction.27 As a 
character in the Symposium will say explicitly, exercise and 
philosophy and pederasty all flourish in the same places 
and among the same people (182b-c).
hardy? (See Symposium 220b, where he is said to have 
walked barefoot even on snow.) Or that he had his mind on 
higher things and ignored mere discomforts in his feet?
Of course, even hardiness calls for further interpretation. 
We should not rush to think that Socrates was merely 
denying himself comforts for he dressed not like any old 
poor man but in that particular unostentatious way that the 
governing class of Sparta did, i.e., the military elite in that 
city who called themselves homoioi (“equals, peers”) and 
who dressed to efface differences in wealth within their 
numbers.19 In other words, Socrates dressed to display his 
solidarity with Spartan culture, even in the midst of the bitter 
twenty-seven-year war between Athens and Sparta.20 This 
view of him supports the Athenian suspicion of Socrates as 
anti-democratic and even as disloyal to the state.
Who were those Athenians who suspected him of 
disloyalty? Again, what might look like non-philosophical 
details can move us toward an informed assessment of 
which elements of the population he most offended. 
When we read about the trial of Socrates—I’ve already 
drawn students’ attention to the points in Plato’s Apology 
at which Socrates asks the jurors to be quiet—I invite my 
students to picture 501 jurors getting noisily impatient.21 I 
draw on the first half of Aristophanes’ Wasps for a profile 
of the stereotypical juror. Philocleon, the hero of Wasps, 
claims to have carried his jury-pay home in his mouth (lines 
609, 787-795)—apparently the way in which the ancient 
Greeks carried their small change.22 An aging male citizen 
counted on jury duty for extra money and would have 
voiced his displeasure at Socrates’ highhandedness about 
the system that had given rise to juried trials. 
Aristophanic stereotypes aside, we know that the jurors 
were not the wealthy men that Socrates mostly kept 
company with. Most ancient people worked on farms, 
but farming life and other sorts of field labor have been 
left out of our picture of classical Greece. I mentioned 
Victor Hanson’s book, The Other Greeks, in which he 
writes about the farmers who made up most of Athens’s 
citizen population. Theophrastus’ character sketch of “the 
rustic” supplements Hanson’s descriptions; see also the 
opening scenes of Aristophanes’ Acharnians and Clouds 
in which those plays’ heroes Dikaiopolis and Strepsiades, 
respectively, describe the life of Athenian farmers in what 
they take to be an alienating big city.
From a social and legal point of view, Josiah Ober is 
essential reading to understanding what was said in 
Athenian courts and how the rhetoric used there was 
intended to be understood. And John Dillon’s Salt and 
Olives fills out our sense of the moral worldview that 
went into many jury decisions.23 Learning more about 
who the jurors were and how they viewed their city helps 
to shift your sense of the trial of Socrates from needless 
blundering into an unjust verdict to deeper worries about 
how the committed participants in a democracy are likely 
to perceive an intellectual critique of democracy.
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It might also have seemed extraneous to the philosophical 
point of the dialogue (or at least tangential to it) that 
I pointed to the talk of slavery in Socrates’ opening 
conversation with Lysis. My purpose was not to reiterate 
that slavery is wrong nor to condemn ancient Greek 
civilization for its callous dependence on slaves (not that I 
do not have those concerns). The work of Page duBois has 
convinced me that although the Greeks rarely spoke about 
their slaves, they can be seen to speak about themselves in 
light of the fact of slavery. For to explicate your own nature 
is to show how you differ from those persons whose nature 
you would never imagine to be worth explicating.
In the Lysis, the use of slaves as a foil for free Athenian 
citizens does not end with the contrasts that Socrates draws 
early on when he asks Lysis why a slave should be allowed 
to drive the mules while Lysis, the son of the family, is not. 
The dialogue ends, and the whole philosophical inquiry is 
interrupted when the paidagôgoi (“tutors, attendants of 
children”) of Lysis and Menexenus appear and call the boys 
to come home (223a). This is when Socrates says (more or 
less), “I say I’m a friend but I don’t know what a friend is,” 
or as we might also put it, “I have not defined myself. There 
is this thing that I am and I don’t know what it is.”
The scene has a realistic touch. The tutors are drunk and 
speak hupobarbarizontes (“with foreign accents”) (223b) 
as most Athenian slaves would have spoken. The Spartans 
had reduced an indigenous Greek population to serfdom 
while Athens mostly used chattel slaves, most of them non-
Greeks normally captives taken in battle. Having foreign-
born slaves in the city probably helped Athens guard 
against revolts for partly Scythian, partly Thracian, partly 
Persian, and also partly Greek, the slaves of Athens would 
not have seen themselves as a unity nor have been able 
to communicate easily. By comparison, Sparta’s Helots 
revolted on several occasions, ruinously for their Spartiate 
oppressors.
The foreign origin of Athenian slaves also made it easier 
for a citizen to distinguish himself from them. These 
particular tutors’ drunkenness only underscores their 
difference from good citizens, as does Socrates’ saying 
that the tutors appeared hôsper daimones tines (“like 
sprites, spirits”) (223a). As duBois observes, the liberty that 
Athenian free citizens place at the center of their sense of 
themselves is not liberty as a positive quality they possess 
but liberty as the negation of the undesirable subordinate 
status of the slaves they see around them. Liberty is not 
being conceptualized in modern terms, as escape from 
governmental intrusion, but instead seems to derive its 
value from signifying that the one who possesses it is not 
a slave.
In other words, although the dramatic entry of the slaves 
is made to end this pursuit of self-knowledge, thus 
figuratively associating self-definition with the work of 
a free man, the idea of enslavement had (like sprites or 
spirits) been haunting the conversation all along. Indeed, I 
would even argue that an unexamined fear of enslavement 
contributes to the tension around the final conclusion 
Socrates springs on the boys, namely, that anagkaion (“it is 
necessary that”) the legitimate erastês (“lover”) phileisthai 
Maybe because the three—sports, romantic seduction, and 
philosophizing—flourish together, they are all more readily 
conceived as competitions. Sports in classical Greece were 
contests between individual athletes, the only cooperative 
effort being that between an athlete and his trainer. This 
difference between ancient Greek sports and our team 
games appears at the metaphorical or proverbial level. A lot 
of sports language today describes rule-abiding behavior 
and its violations, and athletes’ collective effort;28 in Greek 
culture, metaphors from athletics focus on individual 
accomplishment and victory. When Apollo gets his way 
with the Fates he is said to have “tripped them up”; even 
the apostle Paul follows Greek tradition when he contrasts 
what he is doing with inefficacious “beating the air,” i.e. 
shadow boxing.29
We may ask whether the athletic setting of the Lysis leads 
the conversation held between Socrates and the boys 
to take on an air of victory and defeat. People often still 
philosophize that way today, believing that the enterprise 
calls for arguments that “defeat” all others: “knock-
down,” “drag-out” arguments, as they are called without 
embarrassment. Is argumentative “victory” essential to 
clear thinking and the pursuit of the truth, or is it a legacy 
of Socrates’ version of conceptual gymnastics?
The intermingling of athletics, philosophy, and love also 
forces a more uncomfortable question—whether we can 
speak of love without reference to active and passive 
participants or even of winners and losers in affectionate 
relationships. John Winkler has written poignantly about 
the kinaidos, the adult man in ancient Greece who wanted 
to play a passive role in same-sex relations: “Since sexual 
activity is symbolic of (or constructed as) zero-sum 
competition and the restless conjunction of winners with 
losers, the kinaidos is a man who desires to lose.”30 Gender 
may have been fluid for lovers in classical Greece; victory 
and loss were not.
Once alerted to the competitive spirit in athletics that 
comes to apply to philosophical cross-examination on 
the one hand and to romantic affections on the other, we 
can review the dialogue’s philosophical arguments more 
attuned to their assumptions of asymmetry in love. And 
then, when what Socrates says appears to translate most 
smoothly into things we say about friendship and love, we 
may ask to what degree our own thinking presupposes 
a polarity in romantic relationships between pursuer and 
pursued, between the active and passive. 
For instance, it might look surprising that although Socrates 
begins with the friendship between Lysis and Menexenus, 
a reciprocal relationship in which each is the other’s 
philos (212b), his subsequent discussion and the puzzles 
worried over have to do with unequal love—as if that sort 
of relationship were found to be the conceptually more 
interesting one.
Do we want an antipodal organization of phenomena in our 
discussions of love? I propose that by now what you might 
have considered an extraneous detail in the setting of Lysis 
is seen to be a point of some philosophical significance.
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NOTES
1. One example turns up in guides to creative writing: “A short story 
is a story that is short.”
2. In what follows I will specify passages in ancient works using 
standard page or line numbers. In the case of Plato’s dialogues, 
this means the Stephanus pages, a number followed by a letter 
from a to e, which appear in nearly every edition and translation 
of the dialogues. In the case of most other ancient authors I 
will cite, it means the line numbers. Passages in Thucydides are 
marked by book, chapter, and section.
3. Nietzsche, Gay Science, § 340.
4. See G. E. R. Lloyd, Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims 
and Practice of Ancient Greek Science (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989), 158–67.
5. On some of the questions of dating, and what Plato knew about 
Hippocrates, see Jaap Mansfeld, “Plato and the Method of 
Hippocrates,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantium Studies 21 (1980): 
341-362.
6. Armand Marie Leroi, The Lagoon: How Aristotle Invented Science 
(New York: Viking Press, 2014). The author is both a biologist and 
a historian of science, but this book is written to be accessible to 
any educated reader. “His favorite animal,” p. 8.
7. C. R. S. Harris, The Heart and the Vascular System in Ancient Greek 
Medicine (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1973).
8. The appearance of a name prompts me to mention a reference 
work that I have found both invaluable and irresistible: Debra 
Nails, The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other 
Socratics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2002). Look up 
any name you notice in one of Plato’s dialogues, and Nails will 
supply all the information available about that person. Nails 
offers the reminder that “Hippothales” was an aristocratic name 
in Athens (xliv, citing Aristophanes, Clouds, 60-67); as for Lysis, 
she reconstructs his family tree, cites relevant archaeological 
inscriptions, and adds what is known about his extended family. 
His father-in-law “was very likely the Isthmonicus who is known 
to have signed the Peace of Nicias and fifty-year alliance with 
Sparta in 421” (196).
9. On ancient Greek farming see Victor D. Hanson, The Other 
Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western 
Civilization (New York: The Free Press, 1995).
10. Stephen G. Miller (ed.) Arete: Greek Sports from Ancient Sources, 
3rd and expanded ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2004).
11. Donald G. Kyle, Sport and Spectacle in the Ancient World, 2nd 
ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015); Stephen G. Miller, Ancient 
Greek Athletics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Thomas 
F. Scanlon, Eros and Greek Athletics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002).
12. K. J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality, updated and with a new 
postscript (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); 
David M. Halperin, One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: And 
Other Essays on Greek Love (New York: Routledge, 1990); James 
M. Davidson, The Greeks and Greek Love: A Radical Reappraisal 
of Homosexuality in Ancient Greece (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 2007); John Winkler, “Laying Down the Law: The 
Oversight of Men’s Sexual Behavior in Classical Athens,” in 
Before Sexuality: The Construction of Erotic Experience in the 
Ancient Greek World, eds. David Halperin, John J. Winkler, and 
Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 
171–209.
13. Chance the Rapper just announced that he will be paying 
homage to Muhammad Ali at the 2016 ESPY Awards. I know of 
songs that refer to Kobe Bryant, Joe DiMaggio, Rubin Carter, and 
LeBron James. But if such a song were written today by someone 
in love with the athlete’s descendant, it would come around to 
identifying that true object of attention: “You’re the one who 
really knocks me down”; “you can score better than him,” etc. 
To modern tastes, what Hippothales does is excessively indirect, 
almost deceptive.
14. Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, trans. John Raffan (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Richard Buxton, Imaginary 
Greece: The Contexts of Mythology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); Jon D. Mikalson, Ancient Greek Religion, 
hupo tôn paidikôn (“is loved by his darling”) (222a). By now 
Lysis is silent (222a). He and Menexenus nod their assent to 
this conclusion, but mogis (“barely, with difficulty”) (222b). 
The argument is telling them: Someone loves you, and you 
are perforce his friend. You are no freer than a slave when 
it comes to choosing your associates.
The conclusion Socrates brings them to is paradoxical, to 
be sure, and almost certainly false. But would it feel so 
important to ward off that conclusion if you did not think 
you had to demonstrate your status as free citizen? Is being 
a non-slave more fundamental than being a friend? To my 
mind this question is a philosophical outcome of attending 
to the slaves and the condition they represent in and 
around this dialogue.
A last practical thought. I’ve knocked at your door and 
delivered a sales pitch—but where are my vacuum 
cleaners? I have failed to say how this splendid illuminating 
information can actually make its way into the classroom. 
I’m no expert at pedagogical techniques, so I won’t waste 
time and space pretending to say how an instructor can 
best bring historical background into a philosophy course. 
I imagine that it can be done either casually or formally. 
Some people will introduce the kind of context I’ve been 
describing only now and then, as needed and in response 
to student questions. Others will want to add reading 
assignments to their syllabus. The most formal option 
would be to plan student presentations timed to coincide 
with the main reading a class is doing: The students have 
just read Plato’s Apology, so one student reads selections 
from Wasps and describes its image of the juror, or when 
the class begins the Symposium, one student presents part 
of Dover’s Greek Homosexuality.
Under the best conditions, the third option makes the 
most learning possible. But instructors will have to decide 
for themselves how close their classrooms come to the 
best conditions. Are all students prepared to research 
and present necessary information? Will they require so 
much coaching that a side project turns into a major time 
commitment for both student and instructor? 
At the other extreme, the first of the options merely calls 
on the instructor to possess all this additional information 
ready to be dropped into a lecture or classroom discussion. 
Those who already know a fair amount about classical life 
and culture will find it easiest to introduce the material this 
way. To those who don’t, it sounds like a disproportionate 
amount of outside reading. 
In many cases I think that the second option will work 
best. Choose the topic you want to amplify in any given 
semester and find good primary and secondary readings; 
then assign those readings in tandem with the philosophy 
that students are reading. The selections I have identified 
from ancient sources are brief. The secondary sources vary 
from article-length to big, thick, book-length, but even the 
very long sources can be edited for classroom use. It takes 
surprisingly little work, in the end, to enhance the charm 
that antiquity still possesses for modern students.
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Teaching about the Existence of God
Steven M. Cahn
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK GRADUATE CENTER
Relatively few philosophers specialize in the philosophy 
of religion, but many teach an introductory problems 
course in which one usual topic is the existence of God. 
The routine approach is to present and assess the three 
traditional arguments for the existence of God, then shift to 
the problem of evil, and finally the unit on God’s existence 
ends.
My new book, Religion Within Reason (Columbia University 
Press) suggests that this approach often takes place 
within a set of misleading assumptions that may be 
shared by students and faculty members. One of these 
assumptions is that if God’s existence were disproved, 
then religious commitment would have been shown to 
be unreasonable. Various religions, however, reject the 
notion of a supernatural God. These include Jainism, 
Theravada Buddhism, Mimamsa and Samkhya Hinduism, 
as well as “death of God” versions of Christianity and 
Reconstructionist Judaism.
Here, for example, is how Rabbi Mordecai M. Kaplan, an 
opponent of supernaturalism, responds to a skeptic who 
asks why, if the Bible isn’t taken literally, Jews should 
nevertheless observe the Sabbath:
We observe the Sabbath not so much because of 
the account of its origin in Genesis, as because of 
the role it has come to play in the spiritual life of 
our People and of mankind. . . . The Sabbath day 
sanctifies our life by what it contributes to making 
us truly human and helping us transcend those 
instincts and passions that are part of our heritage 
from the sub-human.1
Consider next the outlook of one of the major figures in the 
Christian “Death of God” movement, the Anglican Bishop of 
Woolwich John A. T. Robinson, who denies the existence of 
a God “up there,” or “out there.” Here is his account of the 
Holy Communion:
[T]oo often . . . it ceases to be the holy meal, and 
becomes a religious service in which we turn 
our backs on the common and the community 
and in individualistic devotion go to ‘make our 
communion’ with ‘the God out there.’ This is the 
essence of the religious perversion, when worship 
becomes a realm into which to withdraw from the 
world to ‘be with God’—even if it is only to receive 
strength to go back into it. In this case the entire 
realm of the non-religious (in other words ‘life’) is 
relegated to the profane.2 
Of course, a naturalistic religion can also be developed 
without deriving it from a supernatural religion. Take, 
for example, the outlook of philosopher Charles Frankel, 
another opponent of supernaturalism, who nevertheless 
believes that religion, shorn of irrationality, can make a 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010); Louise Bruit Zaidman 
and Pauline Schmitt Pantel, Religion in the Ancient Greek City, 
trans. Paul Cartledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989). On Hermes specifically, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, “Hestia-
Hermes,” in Myth and Thought among the Greeks, trans. Janet 
Lloyd with Jeff Fort (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983), 
127–75; on mythology generally, see Mortals and Immortals, ed. 
Froma I. Zeitlin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
15. A. G. Geddes, “Rags and Riches: The Costume of Athenian Men in 
the Fifth Century,” Classical Quarterly 37 (1987): 307–31; Larissa 
Bonfante, “Nudity as a Costume in Classical Art,” American 
Journal of Archaeology 93 (1989): 543-70.
16. Leslie Kurke, “Ancient Greek Board Games and How to Play 
Them,” Classical Philology 94, no. 3 (1999): 247–67.
17. Moses Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology (New York: 
Viking Press, 1980); Yvon Garlan, Slavery in Ancient Greece, 
trans. Janet Lloyd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988); G. E. 
M. de Ste-Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World 
(London: Duckworth, 1981); Page DuBois, Slaves and Other 
Objects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).
18. Terry Penner and Christopher Rowe, Plato’s Lysis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
19. Spartans: called “equals,” Xenophon, Hellenica, 3.3.5, Constitution 
of the Lacedaemonians, 13.1; dressed modestly, Thucydides, The 
Peloponnesian War, 1.6.4; went barefoot, Xenophon, Constitution 
of the Lacedaemonians, 2.3. For an introduction, the essential 
book to read is Paul Cartledge, The Spartans: The World of the 
Warrior-Heroes of Ancient Greece, from Utopia to Crisis and 
Collapse (Woodstock: Overlook Press, 2003). For advanced 
discussions, the essential book is Paul Cartledge, Spartan 
Reflections (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
20. Debra Nails, “Socrates,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Spring 2014 edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2014/entries/socrates/.
21. If students do not notice it, they quickly grasp the significance of 
the fact once it’s pointed out to them, that Socrates keeps asking 
the jurors not to thorubein (“make a disturbance”): Apology, 17d, 
21a, 27b, and 30c.
22. Also see Aristophanes, Women in the Assembly, lines 815-822; in 
Theophrastus Characters, “the reckless man” charges interest on 
small loans and puts the interest in his cheek.
23. On courtroom rhetoric, see Josiah Ober, Mass and Elite in 
Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the 
People (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and John 
Dillon, Salt and Olives: Morality and Custom in Ancient Greece 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004).
24. Besides “academy” we have German Gymnasium, Albanian 
gjimnaz, Polish gimnazjum, and similar words in Scandinavian 
languages; meanwhile the Lyceum lent its name to the French 
lycée, Romanian liceu, and Italian liceo.
25. Isocrates, Antidosis, 181.
26. Theognis, 1335-1336; also see Plato, Laws, 636a-c.
27. See Socrates at Lysis, 210e: “I looked over toward Hippothales 
. . . it occurred to me to say, ‘This is how to talk to a boyfriend, 
Hippothales, humbling him and trimming him back, not 
pampering and making him vain as you do.’”
28. Rule-abiding behavior and violations: “a level playing field” 
versus being “out of bounds,” “over the line,” or “below the 
belt.” Collective effort: “a team player,” “stepping up to the 
plate,” “inside baseball.”
29. Apollo trips up Fates, Euripides, Alcestis, 33-34; Paul doesn’t beat 
the air, 1 Corinthians 9.26.
30. John Winkler, “Laying Down the Law,” 186.
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Considering the Classroom as a Safe 
Space
David Sakris
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
INTRODUCTION
In the APA Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, Lauren 
Freeman (2014) advocates that faculty turn their classrooms 
into “safe spaces” as a method for increasing the diversity of 
philosophy majors. Safe spaces, according to Freeman, are 
spaces where students can feel “fully self-expressed” and 
relax “without fear of being made to feel uncomfortable, 
unwelcome, or unsafe on account of biological sex, race/
ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, 
cultural background, age, or physical or mental ability.”1 
Freeman believes that by turning classrooms into safe 
spaces, students from underrepresented groups will be 
more likely to pursue philosophy as a major and more 
actively participate in class.2 This goal of increasing diversity 
among philosophy majors is one I fully support, and I agree 
that much work needs to be done to increase diversity 
in higher education. However, even a casual follower of 
academic news knows that there is much hand-wringing 
over the demand for, and a willingness to create, safe 
spaces on college campuses.3 Few commentators believe 
safe spaces will have positive results: Lukianoff fears that 
not only will safe spaces (among other practices) infantilize 
students, but that the turning away from debate supposedly 
encouraged by safe spaces hinders the development of 
necessary critical thinking skills.4 As part of this pushback 
against safe spaces, George Yancy, one of our profession’s 
few public philosophers, says he actively works to make his 
classroom unsafe.5 The University of Chicago had a similar 
response: in the spring of 2016 the university sent out an 
undergraduate admissions letter stating that students will 
find no support for trigger warnings or the “creation of 
intellectual ‘safe spaces’ where individuals can retreat from 
ideas and perspectives at odds with their own.”6
I also reject turning classrooms into “safe spaces” in part 
because I reject characterizing classroom spaces as safe or 
unsafe, and I write here to discourage faculty from doing 
so, but not because I want to force students to “grow up/
toughen up,” or believe that they need to do so now more 
than ever. I begin by distinguishing between two kinds 
of spaces on campus that can be made “safe”: classroom 
spaces and extracurricular spaces. I argue that the 
extracurricular safe space(s) is consistent with the practice 
of philosophy and the current conception of the university, 
and it is a space/practice to which faculty should have few 
objections. I then argue that making the classroom into a 
safe space as defined by Freeman is not a practical goal, 
especially for a subject like philosophy. More significantly, 
I argue that attempting to turn the classroom into a safe 
distinctive contribution to human life, providing deliverance 
from vanity, triumph over meanness, and endurance in the 
face of tragedy. As he puts it, “it seems to me not impossible 
that a religion could draw the genuine and passionate 
adherence of its members while it claimed nothing more 
than to be poetry in which [people] might participate and 
from which they might draw strength and light.”3
Such naturalistic options are philosophically respectable. 
Whether to choose any of them is for each person to decide.
Teachers and students should also recognize that theism 
does not imply religious commitment. After all, even if 
someone believes that one or more of the proofs for God’s 
existence is sound, the question remains whether to join a 
religion and, if so, which one. The proofs contain not a clue 
as to which religion, if any, is favored by God. Indeed, God 
may oppose all religious activity. Perhaps God does not 
wish to be prayed to, worshipped, or adored, and might 
even reward those who shun such activities.
Yet another misleading assumption is implicit in the 
definitions which are usually offered: a theist believes 
in God, an atheist disbelieves in God, and an agnostic 
neither believes or disbelieves in God. Notice that the only 
hypothesis being considered is the existence of God as 
traditionally conceived; no other supernatural alternatives 
are taken seriously. Why not? 
Suppose, for example, the world is the scene of a struggle 
between God and the Demon. Both are powerful, but neither 
is omnipotent. When events go well, God’s benevolence is 
ascendant; when events go badly, the Demon’s malevolence 
is ascendant. Is this sort of doctrine, historically associated 
with Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism, unnecessarily 
complex and therefore to be rejected? No, for even though 
in one sense it is more complex than monotheism, because 
it involves two supernatural beings rather than one, in 
another sense it is simpler, because it leaves no aspect of 
the world beyond human understanding. After all, theism 
faces the problem of evil, while dualistic hypotheses have 
no difficulty accounting for both good and evil. 
In sum, I would suggest that both faculty members and 
students should remember the following four essential 
points: (1) belief in the existence of God is not a necessary 
condition for religious commitment; (2) belief in the 
existence of God is not a sufficient condition for religious 
commitment; (3) the existence of God is not the only 
supernatural hypothesis worth serious discussion; and 
(4) a successful defense of traditional theism requires not 
only that it be more plausible than atheism or agnosticism 
but that it be more plausible than all other supernatural 
alternatives.
I am not suggesting, of course, that the proofs for the 
existence of God or the problem of evil not be taught. I 
am urging, however, that all participants be alerted to the 
limited implications of that discussion.
NOTES
1. Mordecai M. Kaplan, Judaism Without Supernaturalism (New 
York: Reconstructionist Press, 1958), 115-16.
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CURRICULAR SAFE SPACES
Freeman takes her definition of “safe space” from Kenney15 
and fully defines it as the following:
A place where anyone can relax and be fully self-
expressed, without fear of being made to feel 
uncomfortable, unwelcome, or unsafe on account 
of biological sex, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
gender identity or expression, cultural background, 
age, or physical or mental ability; a place where 
the rules guard each person’s self-respect and 
dignity and strongly encourage everyone to 
respect others.16
Freeman believes that fashioning one’s classroom into 
a safe space will both reduce Stereotype Threat (ST) and 
Implicit Bias (IB). ST is a well-studied phenomenon in which 
the salience of negative stereotypes about an individual 
can affect that individual’s performance. ST involves 
anxiety about being judged on the basis of one’s group 
membership or confirming negative stereotypes about 
one’s group through one’s performance. For example, a 
woman taking a math test may fear confirming negative 
stereotypes regarding women and math, and this anxiety 
ironically leads her to confirm the stereotype: the anxiety 
leads to a worse performance.17 IB is a concern in the 
classroom because unconscious bias can lead faculty to 
treat students from underrepresented groups unfairly, e.g., 
by calling on minority students less often, or by grading 
their work more harshly.18 The hope is that by reducing ST 
and IB women and minority students will feel less “unsafe” 
and as a result more willing to pursue philosophy as a 
major and, perhaps, as a career.
In order to fashion one’s classroom into a safe space, 
Freeman recommends a number of strategies: that faculty 
distribute a survey which asks about classroom climate 
in the first week, that faculty actively discuss stereotype 
threat with students to disarm its effects, that faculty 
discuss classroom climate/department climate in informal 
meetings with students outside the classroom, that faculty 
encourage and mentor students from underrepresented 
groups outside the classroom, and that faculty work to 
make philosophers from underrepresented groups more 
visible in the classroom or in the department. 
I wholeheartedly agree with several of Freeman’s 
suggestions. The first thing to note about the suggested 
interventions is that two of them do not even occur in the 
classroom, and so there is little reason to think that they 
will disrupt the goals of the university: discussing concerns 
of students outside the classroom in a setting with special 
norms and expectations is similar to an extracurricular 
safe space, a place where students can interact by their 
own lights and at will, which, as I argued in section 2, 
are student activities that faculty members should, at the 
very least, be indifferent towards. For example, Freeman 
states that she “started a task force on the status of 
underrepresented groups in philosophy” that she says 
“enabled underrepresented students to feel solidarity 
with one another and created a safe space within the 
department where they could share their experiences with 
other students who were in the same boat.”19 Notably, 
space is at odds with the pedagogical goals of philosophy, 
as well as with how the university currently conceives itself. 
Many of Freeman’s ultimate aims can be achieved in other 
ways, and, I believe, more effectively. Finally, I argue that 
faculty calls for safe spaces creates confusion concerning 
the educative environment one should expect to find at the 
majority of American universities. If faculty and students 
want to advocate for safe campuses that include “safe” 
classrooms, then they should do so by arguing for a 
change in a given university’s code of conduct or mission 
statement. Given different educative aims, classroom safe 
spaces could well be consistent with those aims. 
SAFE SPACE(S) AND THE GOALS OF A UNIVERSITY
We can distinguish between at least two kinds of “safe 
spaces”: extracurricular spaces where students can 
go to find a supportive community in order to “have a 
conversation with students, staff, and faculty knowing 
that they have a basic understanding of the challenges 
these students face in developing their identities”;7 and 
the creation of safe spaces as a pedagogical approach to 
the classroom, as advocated by Freeman.8 The University 
of Chicago admissions letter decries safes spaces on the 
grounds that they supposedly interfere with what the letter 
describes as the “defining characteristics” of a university: 
“commitment to freedom of inquiry and expression.”9 
Safe spaces are typically assailed without any attempt to 
make the foregoing distinction,10 yet it is hard to see how 
spending time in an extracurricular space with practices and 
rules that faculty might disapprove of is much different from 
a student going home each weekend to parents/guardians 
with practices and rules that faculty might disapprove 
of, and for this reason it is hard to see how faculty could 
have grounds for objecting to extracurricular safe spaces. 
Therefore, although the admissions letter never explicitly 
makes this distinction, the letter must be objecting to 
the classroom as a safe space.11 The admissions letter 
also references the University of Chicago’s faculty report 
on freedom of expression, which reiterates the point that 
“universities exist for the sake of free inquiry.”12 The “Report 
of the Committee on Freedom of Expression at Yale” makes 
explicit what is perhaps implicit in the Chicago report: 
that the main goal of a university is the production and 
dissemination of knowledge, and that freedom of inquiry 
supports that goal.13 So if the curricular safe space is, in 
fact, objectionable, the objection must be on the grounds 
that such spaces will interfere with that goal.
So even if we think extracurricular safe spaces are 
“coddling,” they aren’t directly impacting what we can 
take as the default goals of a university, the production 
and dissemination of knowledge.14 Surely students should 
be able to make a dorm room or a student lounge into a 
“safe space” if they so wish, and refuse to make their dorm 
room into a safe space as well—decisions like these would 
be an example of freedom of association and expression 
on campus. Students, however, do not live in classrooms, 
and the classroom, laboratory, and faculty office are the 
primary places where the goals of the modern university 
are carried out. Should these places be turned into “safe 
spaces” as well? Given current conditions, I argue that the 
answer should be “No.” Nonetheless, I accept and support 
many of Freeman’s recommendations, as I shall explain. 
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Here is why: one person’s “being fully self-expressed” always 
has the potential to make another person uncomfortable—
the goal of full-expression and full comfort in many cases 
will be on a collision course.26 Stengel points out that it is 
an unavoidable fact that the conservative Christian students 
who made up a large share of the university population she 
taught at likely felt uncomfortable in her class, Women and 
Education: Socialization and Liberation, due to the students’ 
commitments in relation to the subject matter, as well as 
the fact that they were no longer in an environment where 
their own viewpoint aligned with the majority. As Stengel 
states, “There are reasons to think that both sets of students 
[the conservative Christian students and the avowed 
feminist students who made up the class] experienced 
both comfort and discomfort, both privilege and threat in 
this particular pedagogical environment.”27 Hence such an 
environment could never effectively be made “safe” for 
all—when groups of students have opposing viewpoints on 
an issue (or whole way of life, which may be the case with 
this example), one group’s being at ease will often imply 
that another group will be ill at ease.
Further, attempting to achieve Freeman’s goal could 
require a radical revision of the curriculum: as Stengel’s 
example highlights, it is very likely that some students, 
given their commitments, won’t be completely comfortable 
discussing the ethics of abortion or considering arguments 
for positions with which they strongly disagree, and it is 
hard to see how having a diverse faculty or discussing 
ST would help to mitigate this particular problem. This 
isn’t to say that therefore we shouldn’t care about faculty 
diversity; it is to raise questions about Freeman’s method in 
relation to her definition of “safe space”—i.e, whether her 
recommendations actually make the classroom “safe” and 
facilitate learning. When teaching large sections of ethics 
(or multiple sections), for example, there is some chance 
that a student in the class has had, or considered having, 
an abortion—these are real-life issues that make people 
feel uncomfortable! A student who has had or considered 
having an abortion will almost certainly feel uncomfortable 
when the moral status of abortion comes up, and may 
well have wished that that topic was not included in the 
syllabus, and even dreaded the week in which it would be 
discussed. Nonetheless, it’s hard to see how such a topic 
could be justifiably scrapped from an applied ethics course 
on those grounds, or discussed in such a way that no one 
felt uncomfortable. Having one’s values challenged on any 
issue that one cares about is typically uncomfortable, and 
the interrogation of values is a frequent occurrence in a 
philosophy class. 
It is true that Freeman never tells the reader not to discuss 
certain topics.28 However, she does recommend use of the 
following survey in the first week of class:
During the first week of the semester, we can have 
students write down, share, and as a class, discuss 
answers to the following questions: 
i) What was a classroom situation in which you felt 
unsafe? 
ii) How could this situation have been avoided? 
this task force was not associated with enrollment in a 
particular course. I would encourage any department to 
take steps to make students from diverse backgrounds feel 
more welcome, as well as engage in encouraging students 
from underrepresented groups outside the classroom to 
follow their potential interests in philosophy. I take this to 
be something that any faculty member who cares about the 
future of the profession should engage in.20
A reason for making philosophers from underrepresented 
groups more visible is that it reduces both ST and IB: students 
see people like themselves who have succeeded thereby 
potentially encouraging them, and a faculty member’s own 
biases regarding what a successful philosopher looks like 
may be reduced.21 There are a number of ways to make 
underrepresented philosophers more visible: hire faculty 
members from underrepresented groups, invite speakers 
from underrepresented groups, hang posters of successful 
philosophers from underrepresented groups in the halls 
of the philosophy department, and encourage faculty to 
assign readings from underrepresented groups. A further 
method for reducing ST is to actively discuss ST with 
students, which helps to disarm its effects.22
The hiring of another faculty member will not necessarily 
have an impact on what I do in the classroom, nor does said 
hiring necessarily affect any classroom practices—we can’t 
be sure the new faculty member will implement “safe” 
classrooms regardless of their background.23 The invitation 
of a speaker does not necessarily directly impact what 
happens in the classroom and could well be viewed as an 
extracurricular activity—student and faculty attendance is 
typically optional. Those who want to safeguard the mission 
of the university, it would seem, have nothing to fear from 
these practices. Presenting these practices as practices 
that can be pursued outside the classroom might well 
make them more palatable to the critics of safe spaces. For 
this reason it would be helpful for Freeman to make the 
distinction I drew in section 2. The activities described thus 
far that do have the potential to directly impact classroom 
practice are encouragement to diversify assigned readings 
as well as encouragement to discuss ST in the classroom. 
Again, I take both of these things to be goods: if faculty 
care about tapping into student potential, and encouraging 
students from all backgrounds, then these are things they 
should consider doing—even if diversifying their syllabus is 
a bit “uncomfortable.”24 An astute reader may now wonder 
why exactly I have written in response to Freeman. I turn to 
those issues now. 
AGAINST CURRICULAR SAFE SPACES
After laying out her preferred definition of “safe space,” 
Freeman asks whether the definition is compromised by 
the fact that it is, as defined, unachievable. She answers 
that “even if such a space can never exist, it can still be 
a normative goal towards which we should strive and 
which we should aim to achieve to the best of our abilities, 
acknowledging that a fully safe space might never be 
possible.”25
As Freeman admits, her goal is unachievable; I believe it 
should be rejected as teaching advice on those grounds, as 
I believe the goal is inconsistent with the human condition. 
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that student to be fearful and withdraw from the object of 
fear—be it other students or the subject matter—resulting 
in a failure to truly consider the issue. I believe it would 
be a dereliction of my duty as a philosophy professor to 
expose students only to arguments for the permissibility 
of abortion at some predominantly liberal institution or 
to expose students only to arguments against abortion 
at a predominately conservative one, thereby reaffirming 
their pre-existing beliefs and maintaining, or even thereby 
increasing, feelings of ease and comfort.33 It would also 
violate the stated mission of many universities: it would be 
a stifling of inquiry on the part of the students, as well as 
a failure to disseminate knowledge on the part of me, the 
faculty member. In short: prioritizing student comfort may 
be a pedagogical disservice to them. 
Freeman is missing the point made by Stengel: it is not the 
case that in every single philosophy class underrepresented 
students are going to feel uncomfortable and white male 
students are going to feel comfortable as a default; women 
students might feel comfortable in a course on feminist 
ethics or when a particular topic is discussed and white male 
students might feel uncomfortable—presumably this can 
serve as a learning opportunity for both groups. Additionally, 
by challenging the assumptions of the majority group in a 
classroom, it seems that this could well signal to members 
not in that group that no person’s beliefs are exempt from 
scrutiny, thereby increasing that person’s relative level of 
comfort. Hopefully, in a philosophy class, each student 
is forced to examine some previously unexamined belief, 
e.g., his or her unreflective meat-eating, and this may 
well make that student uniquely uncomfortable. Does this 
render the classroom unsafe on Freeman’s view? Given her 
definition of “safe space,” if the student did not welcome 
such feelings, then the answer is “Yes.” Such a conclusion 
is so at odds with our ordinary understanding of “safety,” 
as well as the practice of philosophy. 
Although none of the activities described by Freeman 
is presented as necessary conditions for making one’s 
classroom “safe,” the line of thinking present in her 
definition of “safe space” and encouraged by her survey 
worries the pundits of academia; I believe that worry is 
well placed. This survey invites students to conceptualize 
the college classroom as an unsafe space to begin with—
one that needs to be made “safe.” It does so by implicitly 
inviting students to think of topics as off-limits, or of 
certain positions as unassailable, thinking that Freeman 
herself claims to reject.34 Yet I have seen this very thinking 
firsthand, and I believe many of my colleagues have as 
well.35 It is wishful thinking to believe that students can 
easily separate out class content from class experience. We 
press slippery slope arguments when they slide our way 
and call them fallacious when they slide against us. But 
some slopes really are slippery and we shouldn’t ignore 
the mounting evidence when we really are sliding down. 
There are other teaching strategies that can be used so that 
students are more likely to feel that they are being treated 
fairly, or more likely to participate in class whatever the 
subject matter, without characterizing the classroom as a 
place where one’s well-being is at severe risk. 
iii) What was a classroom situation in which you felt 
safe? 
iv) How did the professor facilitate this situation? 
v) What have teachers/professors done to create safe 
classroom environments? 
vi) What are your goals for this class? 
vii) How can we as a class help you to achieve them? 
viii) How can we make this classroom a safe 
environment?
Although I support some of the stated goals of the survey, 
such as giving students a stake in how the class proceeds, 
I reject such a survey for the following reasons: 1) a student 
may well answer this survey by saying that certain topics 
make him or her feel unsafe; 2) faculty should reject tools 
that encourage students to conceptualize classrooms as 
safe/unsafe.29
Reason (1) has basically been addressed. It may well be that 
a student answers (i) by responding “I felt unsafe in a class 
in which race was discussed”; this situation has the faculty 
member put him or herself in a bind: they either modify 
course content or risk ignoring the student’s comments, 
defeating the purpose of the survey. Freeman gives no 
advice on how to deal with a student who claims that a whole 
topic would make him or her feel uncomfortable. Freeman 
maintains that for sensitive topics to be fruitfully discussed 
the classroom must be a minimally safe environment,30 
but when the topic itself is the cause of uncomfortable 
feelings, it is hard to see how this is to be achieved. 
The more pressing problem is (2): that the survey encourages 
the student to cast ordinary classroom experience, and 
I take ordinary classroom experiences to sometimes 
involve feelings of discomfort, as “safe” and “unsafe.”31 As 
Strengel points out, by using the “safe/unsafe” language, 
we encourage students to interpret feelings of unease or 
uncomfortableness as fear of a certain topic, position, or 
certain individual(s), which entrenches the problem: 
First, feelings, even uncomfortable ones, don’t 
dictate action. Uncomfortable students may 
well be students on the brink of some new 
understanding. Fearful students, that is, students 
whose uncomfortable feelings have been bound—
by situation or by habit—to particular objects and 
attendant behaviors of withdrawal and avoidance, 
require pedagogical intervention that makes 
engagement possible again. That means that 
students (whether privileged or oppressed) have 
to feel safe enough. It does not necessarily mean 
comfort.32
For Strengel, the ordinary classroom is “safe enough,” 
and to encourage students to seek out “safer” spaces is 
to forego learning opportunities for all kinds of students. 
Encouraging a student to interpret feelings of unease 
regarding a topic or situation as “unsafe” is encouraging 
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CONCLUSION
Safe spaces as described by Freeman are inconsistent 
with the practice of philosophy and the university 
mission as it is currently conceived because it is likely 
very difficult to separate classroom experience from 
classroom content, and the goal of making the classroom 
“safe” could interfere with the purpose of the classroom: 
the dissemination of knowledge. Students should likely 
expect to feel somewhat uncomfortable during their 
college careers, as they are challenged by ideas they have 
never considered before. To then encourage students to 
characterize those feelings as feelings of a lack of safety 
serves to turn whatever circumstances caused those 
feelings into ones that should be avoided—this is what 
a survey like Freeman’s seems to facilitate.39 That does 
not mean, however, that a campus should not have 
spaces where like-minded students can get together and 
support each other on their own terms. Likely current 
unrest on campus cannot be easily explained, contrary to 
the popular belief that it can all be blamed on millennial 
coddling. Colleges themselves deserve some blame. 
Faculty and administrators send mixed messages by 
describing classroom conditions as safe/unsafe, thereby 
encouraging students to reject one of the major values 
of the university environment: free and open inquiry. 
This confusion is further compounded by administrative 
practices such as referring to the campus community 
as a “family”40—I haven’t heard of many families that 
have explicitly stated conditions for expulsion; however, 
many families have certain topics they just don’t talk 
about, and this is precisely the outcome that faculty and 
administrators should fear. To present academic spaces 
on campus as “safe” or “unsafe,” to refer to the university 
community as a “family,” is to create confusion about the 
institutional goal of the university in the minds of those 
institution members. 
It may be the case that universities should adopt other 
missions and goals. Some universities do, in fact, have 
quite different missions from the typical state or secular 
institution. The Brigham Young University mission statement 
states that the university aims to “assist individuals in their 
quest for perfection and eternal life.”41 There is a reason I 
didn’t apply to BYU as a student, and there is a reason that 
I would be unlikely to apply there for a faculty position,42 
the reason being that my values do not match well enough 
with the broader mission of BYU. 
To bring about the sort of space that Freeman calls for 
would require radical changes. A place where no person 
need worry about feeling uncomfortable due to identity 
markers sounds like a place of potentially heavy thought 
policing indeed. Freeman should be arguing for a change 
in the very mission of a college or university, not for 
classroom by classroom changes within the paradigm of 
the open-inquiry university, as this is likely to interfere 
with the existing goals of the open-inquiry university and 
thereby create confusion for institution members. Faculty 
should take steps to facilitate student success, as that is 
part of the dissemination of knowledge. Acting to reduce 
ST and IB is believed to facilitate student success, and so 
conscientious faculty should take steps to reduce ST and 
IB. However, it is not clear where identifying classroom 
ACHIEVING FREEMAN’S GOALS WITHOUT 
TALKING ABOUT SAFETY
As I have frequently stated, I agree with most of Freeman’s 
recommendations: faculty should seek to encourage all 
students in philosophy, encourage them to believe that 
they are all capable of succeeding, and work to reduce their 
own implicit biases; I agree with these recommendations 
because these practices enhance learning outcomes, 
whatever else they may do in relation to feelings of 
comfort. All these things can be done without invoking the 
concept of “safety,” or encouraging your students to “fear 
being uncomfortable.” Steele, one of the pioneers of ST 
research, holds that one way of mitigating ST is to make 
clear that you hold all students to high standards, and 
that you believe that all students are capable of meeting 
those standards.36 Fostering the belief that all students are 
capable of improving is a way of combating feelings of 
inadequacy. This can be carried out by asking your students 
to revise their papers in light of your thorough feedback, 
as giving rigorous commentary on student assignments 
indicates that you believe that each student is capable of 
doing better.37 Further, faculty can reduce IB by grading 
papers using student ID numbers instead of student 
names, as well as simply making an effort to attempt to 
call on all students, e.g., by referring to the student roster 
instead of looking out at a sea of faces, which might invite 
unconscious preference. They can also more effectively 
engage shyer students, or students who are diffident, and 
do not wish to give their opinion to the whole class by 
having students work in small groups on a set of questions 
before they are discussed by the whole class.38 
These are little things, but that doesn’t mean that they 
don’t take effort and that faculty aren’t commendable for 
doing them; these are actions that facilitate learning and 
student success, and to describe them as efforts to make 
the classroom “safe” is a disservice to their real effects 
and the real goal of the classroom: the dissemination of 
knowledge. I believe that these are the activities that should 
be promoted to foster inclusion in philosophy, as they may 
well serve two goods: promoting the learning of all students, 
and making students from underrepresented backgrounds 
feel capable of succeeding. Characterizing classrooms as 
safe or unsafe is counterproductive, and Strengel is likely 
right to maintain that occasions of uncomfortableness are 
opportunities for growth—not occasions to be avoided at all 
costs. We can’t necessarily predict who feels comfortable 
and who feels uncomfortable within a given classroom 
dynamic, and to attempt to do so is a kind of giving in to 
stereotyping. Caring about ST and attempting to counteract 
it makes one a conscientious instructor; however, it can be 
combatted without ever asking your students to conceive 
of the classroom environment as “unsafe.” Safe/unsafe 
talk encourages students to think of themselves as victims 
and other students or experiences (like taking a test) as 
fearful and victimizing. Further, it fosters the belief that 
complete ease facilitates learning, or that it is required to 
learn. However, it may be that great growth comes from 
moments of unease. 
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institutions, may take themselves to have different primary 
goals. For example, Biola University’s mission statement includes 
“impact[ing] the world for the Lord Jesus Christ.” See http://
offices.biola.edu/hr/ehandbook/1.3/.
15. Kenney, Mapping Gay L.A.
16. Freeman, “Creating Safe Spaces,” 4.
17. For a very accessible overview of ST, see Steele, Whistling 
Vivaldi. See also Steele and Aronson, “Stereotype Threat and the 
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans.” 
18. For example, Steinpreis et. al (“The Impact of Gender on the 
Review of the Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure 
Candidates”) found that both women and men show a preference 
for a CV when it is randomly assigned a male name. Saul 
(“Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Women in Philosophy”) 
notes that studies of stereotype threat and implicit bias have not 
been conducted specifically on individuals studying or working 
in philosophy. Saul argues that there is no reason to think that 
philosophers are exceptions to the results found in other fields 
of study.
19. Freeman, “Creating Safe Spaces,” 7.
20. Stark (“Overcoming a Puzzle about Inclusion and Racism”) also 
argues that faculty work to change or challenge institutional 
racism, e.g., by advocating for the removal of names from 
buildings that honor racist individuals. Faculty should advocate 
for the issues they believe in outside of the classroom if those 
issues do not pertain to course content.
21. Saul, “Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Women in Philosophy”; 
Freeman, “Creating Safe Spaces.”
22. Steele, Whistling Vivaldi.
23. Doing so would be just the kind of thing, it would seem, that 
Freeman would want us to combat!
24. The Princeton University “pre-read,” a book the whole campus 
is encouraged to read over the summer, was Steele’s Whistling 
Vivaldi in 2015. As part of the “pre-read” program, incoming 
freshman discuss the pre-read with their residence advisors (e.g., 
an extracurricular setting). This is a nice way of raising awareness 
of a pedagogical obstacle for both faculty and students without 
taking away from classroom time devoted to course content. See 
http://www.princeton.edu/president/eisgruber/pre-read/.
25. Freeman, “Creating Safe Spaces,” 4.
26. Alison Bailey makes a similar point about this definition: topics 
that feel safe to some may well seem annoying or fraught with 
meaning to others. See Bailey, “Navigating Epistemic Pushback in 
Feminist and Critical Race Philosophy Classes.” Stark also states 
that some topics will make some students feel included while 
alienating others (“Overcoming a Puzzle about Inclusion and 
Racism”). An anonymous reviewer rejected my calling the goal 
“incoherent” on these grounds. The reviewer believes although 
empirically the goal may be unachievable, that does not make it 
incoherent. I take the reviewer’s point, but I have trouble even 
imagining a situation in which “everyone is fully expressed” yet 
no one feels uncomfortable!
27. Stengel, “The Complex Case of Fear and Safe Space,” 535.
28. However, Stark does. She suggests faculty avoid Eurocentric 
authors or Eurocentric topics, as “the particular answers given to 
philosophical questions often reflect the Eurocentric and racist 
culture of the authors” (“Overcoming a Puzzle about Inclusion 
and Racism,” 3). Yes, e.g., Aristotle and Kant were racists/sexists. 
Faculty would be remiss not to challenge the assumptions 
of Kant and Aristotle and point out how they are inconsistent 
with the theorists’ own thinking. But to avoid the authors/topics 
seems like professional misconduct. Further, Kant and Aristotle 
have been fruitfully studied by people from all over the world—
Aristotle’s racism did not stop Middle Eastern scholars from 
studying him 1,000 years ago. I don’t think Aristotle thought too 
highly of any non-Greek, yet that has hardly slowed any non-
Greek down in admiring what is admirable in his work. Further, 
to call Plato and Aristotle “male, cis-gender, straight” authors 
seems anachronistic (3-4). I doubt they thought of themselves as 
straight or white—although they were certainly part of the elite 
of their time. Both the Buddha and Confucius were “straight” and 
“cis-gendered,” and the Buddha came from the ruling class, yet 
I’ve never heard anyone lamenting these facts (perhaps I haven’t 
spaces as safe and unsafe actually fits into those practices, 
and efforts to make classrooms into “safe spaces” seems 
contrary to the practice of free and open inquiry. On these 
grounds they should be resisted.
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NOTES
1. Freeman, “Creating Safe Spaces,” 4.
2. Ibid.
3. Shapiro, a former faculty member and college president, says 
that many students have a “prolonged umbilical cord” (“From 
Strength to Strength”); Haidt (a psychology professor) and 
Lukianoff are well known for their Atlantic article on millennial 
infantilization (“The Coddling of the American Mind”); Posner, 
a law professor, argues that “[college] students are children,” 
although he is not dismissive of student demands—he uses that 
claim to explain their demands (“Colleges Need Speech Codes 
because Their Students Are Still Children”).
4. Lukianoff, Unlearning Liberty, 11-12.
5. Yancy, “Loving Wisdom and the Effort to Make Philosophy 
‘Unsafe’.”
6. The content of this letter was reported in a number of media 
outlets. See, for example, Vivanco and Rhodes, “U. of C. Tells 
Incoming Freshmen It Does Not Support ‘Trigger Warnings’ or 
‘Safe Spaces.’”
7. I drew this quote from a University of Chicago web page to show 
that the very university that denounced safe spaces maintained 
safe spaces on campus at the time of the denouncing, which 
indicates that there are multiple ways to understand the term 
“safe space.” https://lgbtq.uchicago.edu/page/safe-space
8. A classroom safe space could have the very same goals as an 
extracurricular safe space, in theory. However, it is important 
to note that the extracurricular space will not have university-
mandated or discipline-specific educational goals.
9. Here is an image of the admissions letter: http://thefederalist.
com/2016/08/25/university-of-chicago-sends-the-acceptance-
letter-every-college-should/
10. See note 1. 
11. The University of Chicago admissions letter does use the phrase 
“intellectual safe space,” which may serve as an attempt at 
differentiation—although we might hope that intellectual activity 
is happening all over the campus of the University of Chicago. As 
stated, most commentators don’t bother to make this distinction; 
nonetheless, some do explicitly object to extracurricular safe 
spaces even without making the distinction. Shulevitz (“In 
College Hiding from Scary Places”) complains that Brown 
University student activists set up a calming room that students 
could go to instead of, or in response to, a talk on campus sexual 
assault. Shulevitz seems to dislike the fact that this room was 
set up with “cookies, coloring books, bubbles, Play-Doh, calming 
music, pillows, blankets and a video of frolicking puppies, as 
well as students and staff members trained to deal with trauma.” 
Yes, it sounds silly, but I am sure many students blew off the talk 
on campus sexual assault to go to a bar, or play video games. 
Which is worse? We should expect students to use their free 
time as they see fit—it is important to note that it was a student 
who organized the described room, just as a student might have 
organized a bar crawl that competed with the campus speaker’s 
time slot.
12. http://freeexpression.uchicago.edu/sites/freeexpression.
uchicago.edu/files/FOECommitteeReport.pdf
13. http://yalecollege.yale.edu/deans-office/policies-reports/report-
committee-freedom-expression-yale
14. I think taking the production and dissemination of knowledge 
as the default goals for most universities is appropriate, but 
universities with special missions, say, religiously focused 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  TEACHING PHILOSOPHY
FALL 2017  |  VOLUME 17  |  NUMBER 1  PAGE 23
Cohen, G., C. Steele, and L. Ross. “The Mentor’s Dilemma: Providing 
Critical Feedback across the Racial Divide.” Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 25, no. 10 (1999): 1302–19.
Freeman, L. “Creating Safe Spaces: Strategies for Confronting Implicit 
and Explicit Bias and Stereotype Threat in the Classroom.” American 
Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 13, 
no. 2 (2014): 3–12. 
Gettings, M. “Student-Centered Discussions in Introductory Philosophy: 
A Case Study on the Nature of Art.” Teaching Philosophy 36, no. 4 
(2013): 321–36. 
Haidt, J., and G. Lukianoff. “The Coddling of the American Mind.” The 
Atlantic, September 2015, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2015/09/the-coddling-of-the-american-mind/399356/.
Jelenik, E. “Using Small Group Learning in the Philosophy Classroom.” 
Teaching Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2013): 137–59.
Kenney, M. R. Mapping Gay L.A.: The Intersection of Place and Politics. 
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2001.
Lukianoff, G. Unlearning Liberty: Campus Censorship and the End of 
American Debate. New York: Encounter Books, 2012.
Mill, J. S. On Liberty. London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1869. 
Retrieved from: http://www.bartleby.com/130/.
Perez-Pena, R., M. Smith, and S. Saul. “University of Chicago Strikes Back 
Against Campus Political Correctness.” The New York Times, August 26, 
2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/27/us/university-of-chicago-
strikes-back-against-campus-political-correctness.html?_r=0.
Posner, E. “Colleges Need Speech Codes because Their Students Are 
Still Children.” Slate. February 12, 2015, http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/02/university_speech_
codes_students_are_children_who_must_be_protected.single.html.
Sandoval, G. “Why Do So Many College Presidents Call Their Campuses 
a ‘Family’?” The Chronicle of Higher Education, July 29, 2016, http://
www.chronicle.com/article/Why-Do-So-Many-College/237301
Saul, Jennifer. “Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Women in 
Philosophy.” In Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change?, edited 
by Katrina Hutchinson and Fiona Jenkins, 71–102. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013.
Shapiro, J. “From Strength to Strength.” Inside Higher Ed, December 
15, 2015, https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2014/12/15/essay-
importance-not-trying-protect-students-everything-may-upset-them.
Shulevitz, J. “In College Hiding from Scary Places.” New York Times, 
March 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/
judith-shulevitz-hiding-from-scary-ideas.html.
Snyder, J. A. “Free Speech? Now That’s Offensive!” Inside Higher 
Ed, September 1, 2016, https://www.insidehighered.com/
views/2016/09/01/dangers-not-valuing-free-speech-campuses-essay.
Stark, Susan “Overcoming a Puzzle about Inclusion and Racism.” 
American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Feminism and 
Philosophy 16, no. 1 (2016): 2–6.
Steele, C. M., and J. Aronson. “Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual 
Test Performance of African Americans.” Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 69, no. 5 (1995): 797–811. doi:10.1037//0022-
3514.69.5.797
Steele, Claude. “Thin Ice: Stereotype Threat and Black College 
Students.” Atlantic Monthly 284, no. 2 (1999): 50–54.
Steele, Claude. Whistling Vivaldi: How Stereotypes Affect Us and What 
We Can Do. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2010.
Steinpreis, R., K. Anders, and D. Ritzke. “The Impact of Gender on the 
Review of the Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure Candidates: 
A National Empirical Study.” Sex Roles 41, nos. 7/8 (1999): 509–28.
Stengel, Barbara. “The Complex Case of Fear and Safe Space.” Studies 
in Philosophy and Education 29 (2010): 523–40.
Vivanco, L., and D. Rhodes. “U. of C. Tells Incoming Freshmen It Does Not 
Support ‘Trigger Warnings’ or ‘Safe Spaces’.” Chicago Tribune, August 
25, 2016, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
university-of-chicago-safe-spaces-letter-met-20160825-story.html.
Yancy, G. “Loving Wisdom and the Effort to Make Philosophy ‘Unsafe’.” 
In Epistemologies Humanities Journal (2011).
looked hard enough). Faculty should teach topics/figures that 
interest them and would do well to increase authorial diversity; 
however, I don’t believe they should leave off central figures 
solely because of the name of the author.
29. We might also wonder if all students have a shared understanding 
of what constitutes classroom safety, which could also throw a 
wrench in effectively administering such a survey. It is not clear 
if Freeman defines what she means by “safe space” to the 
students prior to the survey.
30. Freeman, “Creating Safe Spaces,” 9.
31. I am assuming that no one threatens the students in class, has 
a weapon, or preys upon students in some fashion. I take it that 
these things aren’t occurring in ordinary classroom experiences. 
Perhaps these things happen more frequently than I imagine, 
and so some object to the use of “ordinary.” In that case, I use 
“ordinary” for lack of a better term.
32. Stengel, “The Complex Case of Fear and Safe Space,” 536.
33. There is little more comforting than having one’s unexamined 
assumptions confirmed as truth!
34. Freeman, “Creating Safe Spaces,” 8-9.
35. Consider the case of Peter Singer. Students at the University of 
Victoria shouted down his Q&A session via Skype because they 
disliked his views on what to do about individuals with severe 
disabilities. On his DailyNous site, Justin Weinberg says the 
following about the incident: “As with the case of Charles Murray 
at Middlebury (still being discussed here), the protestors against 
Singer seem motivated by both a mix of well-informed perceptive 
criticism and misunderstanding and misrepresentation.” That 
sounds about right—it sounds like the very thing that should be 
challenged in a philosophy class, regardless of whatever pre-
existing beliefs students have about disability or their desire to 
discuss the topic. See http://dailynous.com/2017/03/09/peter-
singer-event-disrupted-protestors/. I picked this case because it 
concerns a philosopher. Rest assured there are many more like it.
36. Steele, “Thin Ice”; and Steele, Whistling Vivaldi.
37. Cohen, Steele, and Ross (“The Mentor’s Dilemma”) have found 
that giving students rigorous feedback as well as reminding them 
that you hold all students to high standards leads black students 
to attribute less bias to the instructor by demonstrating that the 
instructor takes their work seriously and is holding the student 
to the same standard as everyone else. Additionally, work by 
Aronson, Fried, and Good (“Reducing the Effects of Stereotype 
Threat on African American College Students By Shaping Theories 
of Intelligence”) has shown that encouraging students to think 
of intelligence as malleable boosted student engagement with 
course material as well as college grades. This is consistent with 
the Steele finding: by giving students constructive criticism and 
holding them to high standards, this shows that you expect them 
to improve and that intelligence is malleable.
38. See, for example, Jelinek, “Using Small Group Learning in 
the Philosophy Classroom”; and Gettings, “Student-Centered 
Discussions in Introductory Philosophy.”
39. In a follow-up mid-semester survey she asks students to 
complete the following sentence: “Please stop ...” (Freeman, 
“Creating Safe Spaces,” 7). We can imagine a student completing 
that sentence with “challenging my pre-existing beliefs.”
40. Sandoval, “Why Do So Many College Presidents Call Their 
Campuses a ‘Family’?”
41. http://aims.byu.edu/mission_statement
42. And I would be extremely unlikely to be seriously considered; 
I’ve probably really blown my chances with this article.
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experience machine, the divine command theory of ethics, 
and the impact of death on life, including the question of 
whether death is actually bad for us. 
According to Pianalto, we dismiss the theories of Dworkin, 
Kraut, Wolf, and Darwall as “too vague,” yet we “come to 
the conclusion that there is no general reason to rate either 
Pat’s or Lee’s life as better than the other’s.”2 Put simply, 
our view is that one is living well if one is happy and has a 
morally decent life, and we deny the view favored by most 
philosophers that the intrinsic value or worthiness of one’s 
activities also makes one’s life better. Pianalto wonders 
whether our own view has “made no progress” either, and 
he suggests that we overlook the possibility that someone 
like Wolf could agree with us that “while Pat and Lee do 
different things, there are projects of worth in both lives, 
and so both lives are good.”3
But the view we put forth implies there is no difference 
between the lives of Pat and Lee in terms of their 
worthwhileness because we reject the very criteria these 
other theories seek to impose when evaluating the good 
life. We do not differentiate between Pat’s and Lee’s lives 
in terms of their quality because, in our view, living well is 
simply living happily within the bounds of morality. Views 
that explicitly reject our position cannot view the two lives 
of Pat and of Lee as of equal quality for they appeal to 
standards (such as the worthiness or objective value of 
one’s projects) that must be met if one is to live well. 
Although Lee’s life is morally decent, Lee’s choices do not 
include any of the admirable, worthy, objectively valuable 
activities these theorists invoke when explaining why some 
lives are better than others. (Lee is not married, and does 
not engage in intellectual or aesthetic pursuits, etc.) Thus it 
is not clear what “projects of worth” these theorists could 
appeal to in justifying the judgment that Lee’s life is of 
equal value to Pat’s. 
According to Dworkin, Wolf, Kraut, and Darwall, living well 
must involve more than simply enjoying one’s life; their 
theories require a feature that presumably Pat’s life contains, 
but Lee’s does not. Our view rejects the imposition of such 
additional requirements because, as we argue, no standard 
is plausible as the standard for a good life. 
The consequences for students in thinking about their own 
lives are striking.4
NOTES
1. Matthew Pianalto, “Happiness, Goodness, and the Best Things in 
Life: A Review of Some Recent Books,” Teaching Philosophy 39, 
no. 2 (June 2016): 209–20.
2. Ibid., 215-16.
3. Ibid., 216.
4. One historical note: Pianalto notes that we associate our approach 
with that of Epicurus, but fails to mention that we find more 
satisfying the same outlook found in the Book of Ecclesiastes. 
As we explain, while the dating of Ecclesiastes is uncertain, 
several leading authorities believe it to be a work of the fourth 
or third centuries B. C. E., that is, about the time of Epicurus or 
somewhat later. Given the interaction between the Hebrew and 
Greek cultures that occurred during this period, certain common 
themes might have influenced both Epicurus and the author of 
REPLY TO A REVIEW
On Happiness and Goodness
Christine Vitrano
BROOKLYN COLLEGE, CUNY
In Matthew Pianalto’s recent discussion of Steven M. Cahn’s 
and my book Happiness and Goodness: Philosophical 
Reflections on Living Well (Oxford University Press, 2015),1 
Pianalto suggests that the work could be used effectively in 
both introductory philosophy and ethics courses. I agree, 
but the pedagogical effectiveness of the book depends 
on recognizing a crucial point about the main example that 
Pianalto appears to have missed.
Here’s the hypothetical: 
Pat received a bachelor’s degree from a prestigious 
college and a Ph.D. in philosophy from a leading 
university, then was awarded an academic position 
at a first-rate school, and eventually earned tenure 
there. Pat is the author of numerous books, articles, 
and reviews, is widely regarded as a leading 
scholar and teacher, and is admired by colleagues 
and students for fairness and helpfulness. Pat is 
happily married, has two children, enjoys playing 
bridge and the cello, and vacations each summer 
in a modest house on Cape Cod. Physically and 
mentally healthy, Pat is in good spirits, looking 
forward to years of happiness.
Lee, on the other hand, did not attend college. 
After high school Lee moved to a beach community 
in California and is devoted to sunbathing, 
swimming, and surfing. Lee has never married 
but has experienced numerous romances. Having 
inherited wealth from deceased parents, Lee has 
no financial needs but, while donating generously 
to worthy causes, spends money freely on 
magnificent homes, luxury cars, designer clothes, 
fine dining, golfing holidays, and extensive travel. 
Lee has many friends and is admired for honesty 
and kindness. Physically and mentally healthy, 
Lee is in good spirits, looking forward to years of 
happiness.
As an aside, I should mention that Pianalto, for some 
unknown reason, assumes that Pat and Lee are both male. 
Yet their genders are intentionally left unspecified.
These cases are presented as a challenge to the views of 
Ronald Dworkin, Susan Wolf, Richard Kraut, and Stephen 
Darwall, each of whom presumes that the good life involves 
what Dworkin calls “works of art,” Wolf calls “projects of 
worth,” Kraut calls “flourishing,” and Darwall calls “things 
that matter.” The question is, do any of these theories imply 
that Pat or Lee enjoys a better life than the other? Having 
students grapple with this question would lead students 
to explore a wide range of important and engaging 
philosophical issues, including the nature of morality, the 
relationship between morality and happiness, Nozick’s 
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Ecclesiastes. The matter remains murky, but the similarities in 
outlook between the two are striking, although rarely, if ever, 
noted.) In light of this, using our book at an introductory level 
also offers the opportunity to demonstrate to students that 
philosophy and the Bible may have themes in common. In this 
case, both Epicurus and Ecclesiastes offer the same advice: Be 
good and enjoy.
LETTER TO THE EDITORS
To the Editors: We have all no doubt heard of efforts to rewrite 
Twain’s Huckleberry Finn and remove the N word wherever 
it appears. I have decided to rewrite Dostoyevsky’s The 
Siblings Karamazov to make it impossible to determine 
whether Ivan, Alyosha, and Dmitri are men or women, or 
some combination thereof. Readers will not be able to tell 
whether Dmitri’s lusting after Grushenka is that of a man for 
a woman, a woman for a man, or two men or two women, 
only one of which does the lusting. Readers will also not 
be able to tell whether the elder Zossima is a monk or a 
nun. Captain Snegiryov will be identified only as an officer, 
and readers will not be able to tell whether he is the mother 
or the father of Ilyusha, and whether the latter is a boy or a 
girl or of ambiguous sexuality.
This will help provide a safe space in libraries for students 
who are perhaps challenged by the fact of being gendered 
at all, and they will be less confused when asked which 
lives in the novel are better, happier, or more moral by not 
having to bring gender into their judgment.
I’ll be glad to work on other novels, too!
Respectfully submitted,
Eugene Kelly
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